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I. INTRODUCTION
The Eurobond market is currently one of the most attractive sources
of debt financing for the medium and long-term capital needs of United
States corporations, the federal government and governmental agencies.
Congress significantly broadened and statutorily ensured direct access to
this market in its enactment of Section 127 of the Deficit Reduction Act
of 1984 (the 1984 Act), which repealed the thirty percent withholding
tax on "portfolio interest" paid to foreign investors.1 Thus, in 1984
* This paper reflects developments through October 15, 1985.
The author would like to thank L.G. Harter III, Esq. of Baker & McKenzie, for his critique of
this Comment. Errors, however, remain the sole responsibility of the author.
All citations to the Internal Revenue Code refer to the 1985 version of the Code, unless
otherwise stated.
I Section 127(a) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 648
(1984) [hereinafter cited as the 1984 Act] amended I.R.C. Sec. 871 (1983) (Tax on Nonresident
Alien Individuals) by adding the following new subsection:
(h) REPEAL OF TAx ON INTEREST OF NONRESIDENT ALIEN INDIVIDUALS RECEIVED
FROM CERTAIN PORTFOLIO DEBT INVESTMENTS.-
(1) IN GENERAL-In the case of any portfolio interest received by a nonresident individual
from sources within the United States, no tax shall be imposed under paragraph (1)(A) or
(1)(C) of subsection (a).
(2) PORTFOLIO INTEREsr-For purposes of this subsection, the term "portfolio interest"
means any interest (including original issue discount) which is described in any of the following
subparagraphs:
(A) Certain Obligations Which Are Not Registered.-Interest which is paid on any
obligation which-
(i) is not in registered form, and
(ii) is described in section 163(f)(2)(B).
(B) Certain Registered Obligations.-Interest which is paid on an obligation-
(i) which is in registered form, and
(ii) with respect to which the United States person who would otherwise be required to
deduct and withhold tax from such interest under section 1441(a) has received a state-
ment (which meets the requirements of paragraph (4)) that the beneficial owner of the
obligation is not a United States person.
(3) PORTFOLIO INTEREST NOT TO INCLUDE INTEREST RECEIVED BY 10-PERCENT
SHAREHOLDERS.-
For purpose of this subsection-
(A) In General.-The term "portfolio interest" shall not include any interest de-
scribed in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2) which is received by a 10-percent
shareholder.
(B) 10-Percent Shareholder.-The term "10-percent shareholder" means-
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alone, United States borrowers were able to raise over $21 billion in the
Eurobond market,2 generally at interest rates lower than those available
in the domestic market.' The 1984 volume represents a significant and
(i) in the case of an obligation issued by a corporation, any person who owns 10 percent or
more of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock of such corporation
entitled to vote, or
(ii) in the case of an obligation issued by a partnership, any person who owns 10 percent or
more of the capital or profits interest in such partnership.
(C) Attribution Rules.-For purposes of determining ownership of stock under sub-
paragraph (B)(i) the rules of section 318(a) shall apply, except that-
(i) Section 318(a)(2)(C) shall be applied without regard to the 50-percent limitation therein,
and,
(ii) any stock which a person is treated as owning after application of section 318(a)(4) shall
not, for purposes of applying paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 318(a), be treated as
actually owned by such person.
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, rules similar to the rules of the preceding sen-
tence shall be applied in determining the ownership of the capital or profits interest in a partner-
ship for purposes of subparagraph (B)(ii).
(4) CERTAIN STATEMENTS.-A statement with respect to any obligation meets the re-
quirements of this paragraph if such statement is made by-
(A) the beneficial owner of such obligation, or
(B) a securities clearing organization, a bank, or other financial institution that holds
customers' securities in the ordinary course of its trade or business.
The preceding sentence shall not apply to any statement with respect to payment of interest on
any obligation by any person if, at least one month before such payment, the Secretary has
published a determination that any statement from such person (or any class including such
person) does not meet the requirements of this parargraph.
(5) SECRETARY MAY PROVIDE SUBSECTION NOT TO APPLY IN CASES OF INADEQUATE
INFORMATION EXCHANGE.-
(A) In General-If the Secretary determines that the exchange of information be-
tween the United States and a foreign country is inadequate to prevent evasion of the United
States income tax by United States persons, the Secretary may provide in writing (and publish a
statement) that the provisions of this subsection shall not apply to payments of interest to any
person within such foreign country (or payments addressed to, or for the account of, persons
within such foreign country) during the period-
(i) beginning on the date specified by the Secretary, and
(ii) ending on the date that the Secretary determines that the exchange of information be-
tween the United States and the foreign country is adequate to prevent the evasion of
United States income tax by United States persons.
(B) Exception for Certain Obligations.-Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the
payment of interest on any obligation which is issued on, or before the date of the publication of
the Secretary's determination under such subparagraph.
(6) REGISTERED FoRm.-For purposes of this subsection, the term "registered form" has
the same meaning given such term by section 163(0.
Section 127(b) of the Act amended I.R.C. § 881 (1983) (Tax on Income of Foreign Corporations Not
Connected with United States Business) in a similar fashion.
Section 127(g) of the Act provided that the amendments made therein would apply to interest re-
ceived after July 18, 1984, on obligations issued after that date.
2 U.S. companies raised $18.6 billion, making them the largest single borrower in the Eurobond
market; the federal government and two federally-sponsored agencies raised $2.5 billion. Total bor-
rowings in the 1984 Eurobond market were $81.5 billion. Wall St. ., Jan. 2, 1985, at 16, col. 2.
Total borrowings in the Eurobond market for the first half of 1985 were $66 billion; the volume for
1985 is pegged at $130 billion. The Washington Post, Jul. 14, 1985, at H-6, col. 1.
3 According to the most recently-available statistics, cost savings in the 1983 Eurobond Market
were as high as 119 basis points. Presentation of the Securities Industry Association before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Finance, reprinted in Tax Treatment of Interest Paid to Foreign Persons Hear-
ings before the Committee on Ways & Means on HR. 3025 & H. 4029, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 89-90
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favorable increase over 1983 United States corporate Eurobond issuances
of only $5.2 billion.4
The Eurobond market consists of an informal network of underwrit-
ers and investors which enables issuers in most countries to offer their
debt securities to investors located outside the issuer's country of resi-
dence. In the Eurobond market, payments of principal and interest are
typically made without any deduction for taxes which might be imposed
by the government of the issuer's country of residence.
The general scheme of taxation of foreign investors under the
United States Internal Revenue Code, however, generally requires that a
thirty percent tax be withheld by a United States payor on interest in-
come paid to foreign investors. Therefore, in order for United States cor-
porations to compete effectively in the Eurobond market prior to the
repeal legislation, they had to resort to the use of an "international fi-
nance subsidiary" located in a tax haven jurisdiction. By interposing this
finance subsidiary (and qualifying under various United States tax laws
and treaties), these corporations were able to avoid the United States
withholding tax. This was the state of affairs until July of 1984, when the
repeal legislation was enacted. In essence, the 1984 Act allows United
States corporations to issue debt obligations directly to foreign investors,
without having to utilize international finance subsidiaries.
The repeal legislation,' a product of many years of lobbying by the
securities industry, United States companies and the Treasury, represents
congressional awareness and approval of the importance of foreign capi-
tal to the United States economy.6 The legislation, however, also reflects
(1984) Serial 98-84 [hereinafter cited as May 1, 1984 Hearings]. Latest reports of securities dealers
indicate, however, that some narrowing in yields has occurred. This has been due, in large part, to
the arrival of the U.S. Treasury into the Eurobond market. Cooper, Second Thoughts about
Eurobonds, 19 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 157 (1985). Even now, though, savings of 10 to 125 basis
points are being achieved. The Washington Post, Jul. 14, 1985, at H-6, col. 1.
4 Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1985, at 16, col. 2.
5 Articles on the 1984 repeal legislation include: Feingold & Fishman, The DRA's Elimination
of the "Withholding" Tax on Portfolio Interest, 62 J. TAX'N 170 (1985); Granwell, Repeal of the U.&
Withholding Tax on Interest, 1 STRATEGY IN INT'L TAx 35 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Repeal of the
Withholding Tax]; Granwell, Repeal of the 30% Withholding Tax on Interest Paid to Foreigners, 13
TAX MGM'T INT'L J. (BNA) 306 (1984); Khokhar, The 30 Percent U.S. Withholding Tax on Portfo-
lio Interest Repealed, 984 TAX MGMT. (BNA) A-501 (1984); Segal & Davis, Repeal of the 30%
Withholding Tax on Portfolio Interest, 11 INT'L TAX J. 125 (1985); Shoyer, Tax Treatment of Inter-
est Paid to Foreign Investors-Policy and Practice Concerns, 11 INr'L TAX. J. 283 (1985); Recent
Developmemt, Repeal of the Thirty Percent Withholding Tax on Interest Paid to Foreigners, 26
HARv. INT'L L.J. 303 (1985). Articles on prior legislative attempts to repeal the withholding tax
include Green, Proposed Legislation Would Exempt Qualified Interest Payments From U.S: With-
holding Taxes, 10 INT'L TAX J. 189 (1984); New York State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, The Withhold-
ing of Tax on Interest Paid by U.S. Borrowers to Foreign Lenders, 6 INT'L TAX J. 126 (1979).
6 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITrEE ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D Sass., GENERAL EXPLA-
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congressional fears of increased tax evasion by United States persons,7 a
prediction frequently made by some members of Congress and by certain
consumer and labor organizations who opposed the measure. As a re-
sult, Congress has attempted to balance the often-opposing interests of
these groups, as well as those of the American public. In this regard, the
repeal legislation can be viewed as "a microcosm of the workings of
socioeconomics, politics and the tax law. '
8
The passage of the 1984 Act appeared initially to be a solution to
what had become a complicated and theoretically unsound method of
avoiding the thirty percent withholding tax on interest paid to foreign
investors. Subsequent developments, however, including the issuance of
now hotly-contested Treasury Regulations,9 the entry of the United
States government into the Eurobond market,'0 and the emergence of
stiff competition among London and United States underwriters" indi-
cates that the 1984 Act may have been only the beginning of the increas-
ing debate over the repeal legislation.
The first part of this comment will examine the taxation of foreign
investors and the operation of the Eurobond market prior to the 1984
Act, as well as the events which prompted the passage of the repeal legis-
lation. The second part will explain the provisions of the new legislation
and the treasury regulations implementing those provisions. It will also
discuss the implications of two recently-issued revenue rulings on the use
of tax havens, the practice of treaty shopping, and the effects of these
rulings on existing Eurobond issues. The third part will address the pol-
icy arguments advanced in support of, and in opposition to, the repeal
legislation. Finally, the fourth part will summarize the likely effects of
the repeal legislation, concluding that, overall, the measure will be benefi-
cial to the United States' economy over the long-term.
NATION OF THE REvENuE PRovIsIoNs OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 391-92 (Comm.
Print Dec. 1984). JCS-41-84 [hereinafter cited as EXPLANATION OF THE 1984 ACT].
7 Id. at 393.
8 Segal & Davis, supra note 5, at 125.
9 See infra notes 107-24 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
1 Such competition has resulted in losses to brokers in London's Eurohouses. Glynne, The Big
Eurobond Brawl, 19 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 277 (1985).
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES TAXATION OF INTEREST
PAID TO FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE EUROBOND MARKET
PRIOR TO THE 1984 ACT
A. Taxation of Foreign Investors-In General
Foreign investors (Le., nonresident aliens and foreign corporations)
may earn income in the United States in a variety of ways: employment,
direct ownership of businesses or real estate in the United States, and
ownership of intangible United States assets, such as stocks and bonds.12
To the extent that the investor is a resident of the United States or de-
rives income from the active conduct of a trade or business in the United
States, the resulting income will be taxed in the same manner that such
income is taxed to United States citizens (iLe., at regular graduated
rates).13 Passive income from investments in United States assets such as
interest and dividends is, however, notwithstanding the repeal on "port-
folio interest," generally subject to a flat thiry percent tax'4 which is
withheld at the source of payment.15
B. The Eurobond Market and Finance Subsidiaries
The existence of the withholding tax on interest income has histori-
cally influenced the manner in which foreigners have invested in United
States assets and, consequently, the manner in which United States busi-
12 For details on the Internal Revenue Code's treatment of foreign investors, see generally P.
PoSEwArrE & M. COLLINS, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAXATION (1980 & Supp. 1985) and
P. PosTLEwArrE & M. COLLINS, INTERNATIONAL INDIVIDUAL TAXATION (1982 & Supp. 1985).
13 I.R.C. §§ 871(b) and 882. Such income is said to be "effectively connected" with the conduct
of a trade or business within the United States and thus, is not subject to the provisions of LR.C.
§§ 871(a) and 881(a).
14 I.R.C. §§ 871(a) and 881(a) impose a 30% withholding tax on U.S. source income that is
"fixed or determinable, annual or periodical" and that is not "effectively connected with the conduct
of a trade or business within the United States." Such income may include salaries, interest, divi-
dends, rents, royalties and similar items. I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1)(A) and 881(a)(1). Articles on the ap-
plication of the withholding tax include Dale, Withholding Tax on Payments to Foreign Persons, 36
TAX L. REv. 49 (1980) (and sources cited therein at n.16); and Note, The Scope of the Withholding
Tax on Payments to Aliens: A Survey, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359 (1984) (and sources cited
therein at n.23).
In this context, the term "withholding tax" does not refer merely to the method of tax collec-
tion; it also represents the effective tax imposed. Minor Tax Bill&- Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Select Revenue Measures of the Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980) Serial 96-
115 (statement of Donald Lubick, Asst. Sec'y for Tax Policy, Dept. of Treasury) [hereinafter cited as
Minor Tax Bills]. The imposition of the 30% withholding tax is subject, however, to certain statu-
tory exemptions and treaty reductions. See infra note 20.
15 I.R.C. §§ 1441(a) and 1442(a). Sec. 127(e) of the 1984 Act added an exception to these Code
sections for "portfolio interest." See I.R.C. § 1441(c)(9), which provides an exception for withhold-
ing on interest income from "portfolio debt investments" unless the withholding agent "knows, or
has reason to know, that such interest is not portfolio interest by reason of § 871(h)(3)."
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nesses have financed their operations. 16 In an effort to reduce the interest
rates they were paying on debt, corporations began as early as the 1960s
to access an alternative supply of investment funds by offering their de-
bentures to foreign investors in the Eurobond market. 7 The imposition
of the thirty percent withholding tax on interest paid to these investors,
however, initially made this an unattractive mode of financing. Since
foreign investors could invest in the debt obligations of governments and
businesses of other countries without the payment of such taxes,' a
United States offeror would have had to increase the yield of its obliga-
tion by forty-three percent' 9 in order to compensate the investor for the
thirty percent United States withholding tax and to compete with other
issuers. This prospect was totally unacceptable to most United States
issuers. Moreover, while there were several exceptions to the rule requir-
ing withholding,20 such provisions would not allow direct issuance of the
16 An investor typically looks at two fundamental elements when considering how much of his
funds to allocate to an investment: the expected return and the riskiness of the investment. To the
extent that taxes reduce the investors return (by up to 30% of the stated rate of return under the
withholding rules), the investor is likely to allocate less of his funds to that investment, assuming
that taxes on similar types of investments are less. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH S-RVtcE, U.S. ECO-
NOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: THE 30 PERCENT WITHHOLDING TAX AND
THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN REA PROPERTY TAX ACT: Two IssuEs IN THE TAXATION OF
FOREIGN ]NvESTmENT, 9-10 (MAY 30, 1984) RPT. No. 84-60E [hereinafter cited as CRS STuDY].
17 The Eurobond market is a segment of the Eurocurrency market; as such, the bonds issued in
that market are acquired by investors with funds deposited outside the borrower's country. Since
the bonds are issued outside the borrower's country, the market is largely unregulated and untaxed.
Thus, borrowers can raise funds more quickly and more easily, and generally, at a lower cost that in
their home country. Eurobonds are generally issued in bearer form, allowing the investor anonym-
ity, and the interest is paid free of withholding taxes. Baxter, International Financial Markets and
Loans: An Introduction to the Legal Context, 10 CAN. Bus. LU. 198 (1985). In addition to lower
interest rates, the Eurobond market generally allows borrowers to utilize early redemption agree-
ments and more flexible debt covenants than are available in the domestic financing market. Taylor,
Foreign Financings by US. Companies, 41 INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 26.02 at 26-3 (1983).
18 In the Eurobond market the debt obligations, issued in bearer form, are free of taxes withheld
at source. This may be because there is no withholding tax imposed (the Netherlands), because there
is a specific exemption for Eurobonds (Australia, Canada, or France), or because no withholding tax
is imposed on borrowings through finance subsidiaries. Ia at 26-3. Eurobond issues are usually
marketed on an indemnified basis wherein the issuer agrees to absorb the cost of any tax which might
be imposed as a result of a change in the tax laws. Alternatively, the bonds may also be callable at
the issuer's option. EXPLANATION OF THE 1984 ACT, supra note 6, at 389.
19 Taylor, supra note 17, at 26-4 ($1.00 - 70% = $1.43 or 70% X 1.43 = $1.00).
20 Statutory exceptions to the imposition of the 30% withholding tax prior to the 1984 Act
included:
a) capital gains income earned by foreign investors;
b) interest from deposits in U.S. banks (I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(1)(A) and 861(c));
c) original issue discount on obligations maturing in six months or less from the original issue
date (I.PC. §§ 871(a)(1)(A) and (C), 871(g)(1)(B), 881(a)(1) and (3));
d) interest paid by a domestic corporation which earns less than 20% of its gross income from
sources within the United States (an "80/20 company") (I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(1)(B));
e) income paid to foreign governments or instrumentalities on investments in U.S. interest
bearing obligations held in non-commercial contexts (I.R.C. § 892).
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type of obligations sold in the Eurobond market.21
In an effort to overcome these barriers, corporations began to issue
their obligations to foreign investors through foreign "finance subsidiar-
ies" located in a country with which the United States had a treaty ex-
empting interest payments.22  Corporations generally chose the
Netherlands Antilles as the site for incorporation of the finance subsidi-
ary because of the favorable terms of the United States - Kingdom of the
Netherlands Income Tax Convention, as extended to the Netherlands
Antilles (U.S.-N.A. Treaty)23 and the Netherlands Antilles' internal tax
structure.24 The Antillean finance subsidiary would issue its own obliga-
Tax treaties between the United States and various other countries also contain exceptions to or
reductions in the rate of the imposition of the 30% withholding tax on interest or dividends. The
exemption is based on the assumption that the income will be taxed by the recipient's country of
residence. Treaties under which the withholding rate is reduced to zero include those with Austria,
Denmark, Finland, West Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, the Netherlands Antilles, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom.
Treaties with the following countries allow for reciprocal rate reductions: Belgium, Canada, Egypt,
Morocco, the Philippines (15%), Jamaica, Malta (12.5%), Korea (12%), France, Japan, Romania
(10%) and Switzerland (5%). Some treaties exempt only certain types of interest (such as bank
interest or interest on public debt). JOINT CoMMrITEE ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D Sass., TAX
TREATMENT OF INTEREST PAID TO FOREIGN INOvasoRs 3-4 (Comm. Print 1984) JCS 23-84 [here-
inafter cited as JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT OF 1984].
21 Such exemptions or reductions do not allow direct issuance of United States corporate obliga-
tions in the Eurobond market because (1) the United States does not have treaties with all countries;
(2) in some cases, the withholding tax is merely reduced; and (3) treaty benefits extend only to
residents of the treaty country, so that resale of the obligation may be difficult. Taylor, supra note
17, at 26-6. Moreover, in the case of bearer obligations, there is no way to know the residence of the
owner so as to ensure that the owner is entitled to treaty benefits.
22 The use of finance subsidiaries began at a time in the 1960s when corporations began to bor-
row in the Eurobond market because of a government program to prevent the devaluation of the
dollar through fixed exchange rates. Several programs were developed to encourage companies to
borrow overseas: the Interest Equalization Tax (IE), the Foreign Direct Investment Program, and
the Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program. There was also a general relaxation of the no-
action letter policy of the SEC as to foreign bond issues and a change in IRS ruling policy which
encouraged the use of foreign finance subsidiaries. IRS rulings provided, in general, that such sub-
sidiaries would be respected as separate entities, and that no withholding tax would be imposed
where the subsidiary's debt-to-equity ratio did not exceed 5:1 and certain other conditions were
present. Rev. Rul. 73-110, 1973-1 C.B. 454; Rev. Rul. 72-416, 1972-2 C.B. 591; Rev. Rul. 70-645,
1970-2 C.B. 273; Rev. Rul. 69-501, 1969-2 C.B. 233; Rev. Rul. 69-377, 1969-2 C.B. 231; JOINT
COMMITrEE PRINT OF 1984, supra note 20, at 9.
23 The United States-Kingdom of the Netherlands Income Tax Convention of April 29, 1948, 62
Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1855 (T.D. 5778, 1950-1 C.B. 92), as modified and supplemented by the
Protocol of June 15, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 3703, T.I.A.S. No. 3367 (1956-2 C.B. 1116), and by the Protocol
of October 23, 1963, 15 U.S.T. 1900, T.I.A.S. No. 5665 (1965-1 C.B. 624), applies to the Nether-
lands Antilles [hereinafter cited as the U.S.-N.A. treaty].
The U.S.-N.A. treaty has been under active renegotiation for over four years. See infra note 35.
24 See infra note 26. A finance subsidiary could be established in any country with which the
United States has a treaty providing for a low or zero rate of withholding on U.S. source interest
income and where there are local laws exempting withholding on interest paid to nonresidents.
Sarafopoulos, Eurobond Financings, Current Techniques and New Proposals, 9 INT'L TAX J. 399, 402
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tions in the Eurobond market, with the United States parent guarantee-
ing the bonds. Proceeds of the offering were then reloaned to the United
States parent on the same terms as the Eurobond issue, but at one per-
cent over the rate to be paid on the Eurobonds. Payments of interest and
principal could, through the use of the U.S.-N.A. treaty, pass tax-free
from the United States parent to the Antillean finance subsidiary;2 inter-
est and principal paid to the foreign investor were also tax-free.26 The
Antillean finance subsidiary would realize net income for the one percent
interest differential, on which the Antillean government imposed a tax of
about thirty percent.27 However, the United States parent was allowed
an offsetting credit on its corporate income tax return for these taxes paid
to the Antillean government.28 Indirectly, this credit resulted in a trans-
fer of tax revenues from the United States Treasury to that of the Anitl-
lean government.29
The use of the Netherlands Antilles as an outlet for the issuance of
Eurobonds increased over the years3" as the volume of Eurobond financ-
n.14 (1983). See also Gelinas, Tax Considerations for US. Corporations Using Finance Subsidiaries
to Borrow Funds Abroad, 7 J. CORP. TAX'N 230 (1980).
If a company is seeking funds for use abroad it can establish a finance subsidiary in the United
States (a so-called "80/20 company"). See JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT OF 1984, supra note 20, at 7-
11 for a description of this type of finance subsidiary arrangement.
25 Art. VIII of the U.S.-N.A. treaty provides that interest received by an Antillean corporation
from U.S. sources is exempt from withholding taxes. Although Art. 1(1) of the protocol denied this
exemption to Antillean investment companies (such as a finance subsidiary), the Internal Revenue
Service (the "Service"), in Rev. RUl. 65-16, 1965-1 C.B 626, stated that the exemption would apply
to such companies if they elected to be taxed at regular Antillean corporation profits tax rates.
Sarafopoulos, supra note 24, at 403; Gelinas, supra note 24, at 240-41. See infra note 127 for the
exact wording of Art. VIII.
26 Art. XII of the U.S.-N.A. treaty provides an exemption from U.S. tax for interest paid by a
Antillean corporation unless the recipient is a citizen, resident or corporation of the United States.
Furthermore, the Antillean government does not impose withholding taxes on interest from debt
obligations of Antillean corporations paid to nonresidents. Gelinas, supra note 24, at 240.
27 Id at 241.
28 The finance subsidiary is considered a "controlled foreign corporation" under I.R.C.
§§ 951(b) and 957(a) (defined infra note 52), and, accordingly, its net income is treated as a deemed
dividend distribution under I.R.C. § 951 Subpart F provisions. The dividend was classified as for-
eign-source income prior to the 1984 Act, Treas. Reg. § 1.960-1(h)(1), and accordingly, entitled the
U.S. parent to a deemed foreign tax credit under I.RC. § 960. Sarafopoulos, supra note 24, at 405.
Under new .LRC. § 904(g), such income will now be classified as U.S. source income, thus reducing
the foreign tax credit limitation.
29 A transfer resulted to the extent that the U.S. corporation's tax liability was reduced by taxes
paid to the Antillean government. Taylor, supra note 17, at 26-21.
30 The amount of portfolio interest paid to foreign persons through the Netherlands Antilles
increased from $97 million in 1977 to $1 billion in 1981, and to almost $1.5 billion in 1982. These
figures represented, respectively, 19%, 31% and 29% of total portfolio interest paid in those years.
JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT OF 1984, supra note 20, at 12; 1983-84 Misc. Tax Bills VI: S. 1066, S.
1550, S. 1557 and S. 1666: Joint Hearings before the Subcomm. on Savings, Pension, & Investment
Policy and Subcomm. on Taxation & Debt Management of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th
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ing by United States companies grew. In 1978, Eurobond issuances by
these companies amounted to $1.1 billion.3 1 For the first seven months
of 1984 (prior to the passage of the 1984 Act), this figure was $5.0
billion.32
As United States corporate use of finance subsidiaries increased over
the years, pressures began to mount against the use of this financing tech-
nique. Those who favored direct issuance of Eurobonds (mainly corpo-
rate executives and the securities industry) argued that the use of a
finance subsidiary was a costly, complicated procedure which was not
only inefficient, but which also kept smaller companies from accessing
the Eurobond market.3 Additionally, critics of the treaty system
pointed out that nonresidents were utilizing bilateral treaties for treaty-
shopping purposes.34 While termination and renegotiation of treaties
could be used to combat such abuses, Treasury was reluctant to adopt
this approach with the Antilles because of the adverse effects that re-
demption of existing Eurobond issues would have on United States credit
markets.35 Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service (the Service) had
Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1557]; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 7553 RELATING TO EXEMPTIONS FROM
U.S. TAX FOR INTEREST PAID TO FOREIGN PERSONS, 12-13 (Comm. Print June 1980) JCS 29-80.
In the sense used in this footnote, "portfolio interest" means interest, received by a person residing in
a foreign country, on debt instruments with maturities of more than one year. U.S. TREASUTY
DEP'T., REPORT To THE CONGRESS ON FOREIGN PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES vii (1976).
31 JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT OI 1984, supra note 20, at 20.
32 Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1984, at 34, col. I (estimated on basis of graph). This figure would likely
be higher were it not for the uncertainties in the relevant tax laws which existed throughout the first
half of 1984. Total 1984 Eurobond issues by U.S. companies amounted to $18.6 billion. Wall St. J.,
Jan. 2, 1985, at 16, col. 2. Many believe that this large gain is indicative of the success of the repeal
legislation.
33 Rep. Sam Gibbons, in his push to enact his repeal bill, H.R. 3025, frequently referred to the
withholding tax as a tariff on small business. This attack is perhaps best illustrated in the hearings
held on H.R. 3025 and H.R. 4029 (the Barnard bill). May 1, 1984 Hearings, supra note 3, at 42-43.
34 Treaty shopping may be defined as the use of a tax treaty by third country investors to avoid
the payment of any taxes on the income they derive, not just to avoid double taxation thereon. The
use of treaty shopping has been the focus of several recent articles and congressional investigations,
and has been the Treasury Department's prime reason for seeking to renegotiate the U.S.-N.A.
treaty. For information on this subject, see Comment, Income Tax Treaty Shopping: An Overview of
Prevention Techniques, 5 Nw. . INT'L L. & Bus. 626 (1983), and sources cited therein; Freud,
Treaty Shopping and the 1981 U.S. Treasury Draft Model Income Tax Treaty, 6 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 627 (1983) and sources cited therein; IRS, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE BY U.S.
TAXPAYERS-AN OVERVIEw, (1981) (prepared by Richard A. Gordon) [hereinafter cited as TAX
HAVENS], updated in DEFT. OF TREASURY, TAX HAVENS IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN, (Jan. 1984);
Tax Evasion Through the Netherlands Antilles and Other Tax Haven Countries Hearings before the
Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on Tax Evasion]; Offshore Tax Havens: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Over-
sight of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
35 See infra note 192. The U.S.-N.A. treaty has been in various stages of renegotiation for over
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begun to question the validity of finance subsidiary operations on audit,
arguing, under several theories, that while the Eurobond obligations
were, in form, those of the finance subsidiary, that in substance, they
were obligations of the domestic parent and, thus, subject to the thirty
percent withholding tax.36 Finally, changes were proposed in both the
House and Senate versions of the 1984 Act that would have eliminated
the foreign tax credit taken by the United States parent for taxes paid by
the finance subsidiary to the Netherlands Antilles.37 The proposed
four years. The Treasury Department believes that it is receiving an insufficient information ex-
change from the Antillean government on tax evasion, criminal activities, and drug operations in-
volving U.S. taxpayers. Hearings on Tax Evasion, supra note 34, at 571. See also Comment,
Renegotiations of the US.-Netherlands Antilles Tax Treaty, 18 TEx. INT'L LJ. 400 (1983).
36 This argument would be based on the theory that the finance subsidiary is inadequatley capi-
talized. The Service's position in its earlier rulings respected the finance subsidiaries as independent
entities if their debt-to-equity ratio was no greater than 5:1, see supra note 22. Concurrent with the
U.S. government's decision to abandon the fixed-exchange rate system in 1974, the Service revoked
those earlier rulings and, in a separate ruling, stated that, "the mere existence of a five to one debt-to-
equity ratio... should no longer be relied upon" as a basis for the conclusion that the obligations of
the subsidiary in fact represent debt of the subsidiary (rather than that of the guarantor). Rev. Rul.
74-464, 1974-2 C.B. 46. Subsequent bond issues through finance subsidiaries therefore relied on
opinions of counsel, who usually recommended that the subsidiary have a more conservative debt-to-
equity ratio (3:1 or lower) and that it have assets, equal to its equity, not loaned back to the guaran-
tor. Taylor, supra note 17, at 26-11.
In addition to attacking the finance subsidiary operation on the inadequate capitalization the-
ory, the Service might also challenge its existence on the agency or conduit theory, L., because the
subsidiaries are largely paper corporations whose obligations are guaranteed by the U.S. parent, the
subsidiary's bonds might, in substance, be treated as the debt obligation of the U.S. parent. Aiken
Industries, 56 T.C. 925 (1971). The Service might also attempt, though probably unsuccessfuly, to
disregard the subsidiary as a separate legal entity; but see PerryR. Bass, 50 T.C. 595 (1968). Gelinas,
supra note 24, at 250-55. See also Rev. Rul. 84-152, infra note 125, which may support any or all of
these three theories because of its potentially broad application and rationale. Finally, the use of the
finance subsidiary might be viewed as having as its principal purpose the avoidance of the withhold-
ing tax on its parent, with the result that the treaty exemption might not apply. I.R.C. § 269.
As of late 1983, there were at least 25 IRS audits challenging finance subsidiary transactions.
One company, Texas International, disclosed the existence of such an audit in its proxy statement.
See 46 TAXEs IN'L 13 (Aug. 1983).
37 Provisions in both the House and Senate bills sought to recharacterize the interest income of
the finance subsidiary as U.S. source income, thereby reducing or eliminating the foreign tax credit
for Antillean taxes paid by the finance subsidiary (§§ 141 and 142 of H.RL 4170 and §§ 128 and 129
of H.R. 2163). Thus, unless a large enough interest rate differential could be obtained in the
Eurobond market to offset the loss of the tax credit (which most experts thought unlikely), compa-
ies would no longer be able to achieve any savings by using the Antillean Eurobond route. JOINT
CoMMIT-EE PRINT OF 1984, supra note 20, at 17. Moreover, forcing companies back into the U.S.
domestic financing market would probably have resulted in higher overall interest rates, which Con-
gress and the Administration sought to avoid.
The recharacterization provision was, in fact, enacted as I.R.C. § 904(g). As direct access to
the Eurobond market was provided by the 1984 Act, however, the provision was not fatal to
Eurobond financings. Until it became clear that the withholding tax would be repealed, the presence
of these resourcing rules created great uncertainty for companies planning Eurobond issues through
the Antilles. Bus. WK., Apr. 16, 1984, at 154. I.R.C. § 904(g) will, however, affect companies
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changes threatened to halt Eurobond financings unless some other form
of access were created. These factors, combined with the overwhelming
influence of the Treasury Department and its desire to finance govern-
ment deficits at a lower cost,38 ultimately pushed Congress to approve a
repeal of the thirty percent withholding tax on interest paid to foreign
investors.
C. The Repeal Proposals
Members of Congress began to propose a repeal of the thirty percent
withholding tax on portfolio interest as early as 1975.11 These proposals,
however, were unpopular with the legislative majority of the day and,
thus, met with little success.' By the 98th Congress, the legislators'
whose Eurobond issues were "grandfathered" by § 127(g)(3) of the Act. See infra note 76 and
accompanying text.
38 The Treasury Department actively supported H.R. 3025, a bill which would have repealed
withholding on a broad class of securities and allowed the federal government to market its obliga-
tions in the foreign market on a tax-free basis, and thus, at a lower interest rate. Although two
investment banking firms-First Boston and Morgan Guaranty-sought to keep the federal govern-
ment out of the competition for foreign funds on the theory that it would drive up Eurobond interest
rates, Treasury officials were not sympathetic: "We cannot accept the argument that Treasury
should pay more so that some U.S. corporations may pay less." May 1, 1984 Hearings, supra note 3,
at 26 (statement of Ronald Pearlman of the Treasury Dept.). See also 23 TAX NoTES 322 (Apr. 16,
1984).
Many viewed the broad form of repeal which Treasury supported as the measure most likely to
increase tax evasion by U.S. citizens through purchases of bearer bonds. Thus it was ironic that
Treasury had a foot in both camps-though it sought to prevent tax evasion, it also wanted to lower
the enormous costs of financing the federal government. 24 TAX NoTEs 325 (Jul. 23, 1984). The
extent of Treasury support was illustrated when, in a rare move, then-Secretary of the Treasury
Donald Regan met with House and Senate conferees in private session during the conference on the
1984 Act to urge passage of the repeal legislation. Id.
39 In considering the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the House Committee on Ways and Means voted
to repeal the 30% withholding tax on both interest and dividends. However, the provision was
removed from the bill by the House of Representatives on December 4, 1975 by a vote of 301-119.
121 CONG. REc. 38,686-87 (1975). The Senate Committee on Finance then proposed an amendment
which would repeal withholding only on interest. The Senate deleted this amendment from the bill
on the Senate floor on July 26, 1976 by a vote of 54-34. 122 CONG. REc. 23,874-80 (1976).
Hearings were held in 1976 on the repeal issue. Foreign Portfolio Investments in the United
States: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Finance and Resources of the Senate
Committee on Finance, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings on Foreign
Investment]. These early materials contain the best summary of arguments in opposition to the
repeal measures.
In December 1979, the Senate Finance Committee reported H.R. 2297 (a bill to suspend duties
on synthetic rutile) with committee amendments to repeal the withholding tax on interest paid to
foreign investors. H.R. 2297, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 36,330 (1979). H.R. 7553,
identical to H.R. 2297, was reported from the House Ways & Means Committee. H.R. 7553, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 14,049 (1979). Hearings were held on H.R. 7553 in June 1980.
Minor Tax Bills, supra note 14. Neither the House nor the Senate acted on these bills.
40 Though the early proposals were similar to the enacted legislation, those proposals met with
little success. Several factors probably contributed to the success of the repeal legislation during the
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views had changed somewhat, and four repeal measures were proposed.
An overview of these proposals is helpful to an analysis of the policy
issues underlying the repeal legislation.
(1) Gibbons-Conable (H.R. 3025) and Chafee-Bentsen (S. 1557):41
H.R. 3025 and S. 1557 would have exempted from withholding portfolio
interest received on three categories of debt: assumed,42 bearer43 and
registered.' As a broad form of immediate repeal, the bill granted direct
access to foreign capital markets to United States businesses, the federal
government, and governmental agencies.4'
98th Congress, including the increased importance of capital markets to the U.S. economy and the
financial expertise and aggressiveness of then-Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, a former Wall
Street banker.
41 H.R. 3025, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REc. E2296 (daily ed. May 17, 1983); S. 1557,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S9334 (daily ed. Jun. 28, 1983). In July 1983, the first
hearings were held on H.R. 3025 (proposed by Reps. Gibbons and Conable). Revenue Increase
Proposals: Hearings before the Comm. on Ways & Means, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) Serial 98-48
[hereinafter cited as Revenue Increase Proposals]; see also May 1, 1984 Hearings, supra note 3, on
H.R. 3025 and a description of the bill in JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT OF 1984, supra note 20. Later,
in September 1983, two Senate Finance Subcommittees held a joint hearing on S. 1557 (a companion
bill to H.R. 3025 that was similar, though not identical to it). Hearings on S. 1557, supra note 30.
The Senate Finance Committee, however, took no action at that time.
42 "Assumed" debt referred to debt obligations of U.S. corporations that would have been issued
on or prior to the date of enactment. The obligations would have to have been guaranteed by the
U.S. corporation at issuance and sold under "arrangements reasonably designed to ensure that they
would be sold (or resold) only to non-U.S. person." This provision would have allowed U.S. corpo-
rations to assume the outstanding obligations that they had issued through Antillean finance subsidi-
aries and to pay interest on those obligations on a tax-free basis. JOINT COMMrrrEE PRINT OF 1984,
supra note 20, at 14.
43 "Bearer" debt refers to debt which is not in registered form, but rather, which is payable to
the person in physical possession of the obligation. Such debt would include only those obligations
(1) sold under procedures reasonably designed to prevent sale to U.S. persons and (2) where the
interest would be payable outside the U.S. and its possessions. Id. In addition, S. 1557 required that
the face of any bearer obligation contain a statement that U.S. holders would be subject to limita-
tions under U.S. income tax laws. Hearings on . 1557, supra note 30, at 34.
These three requirements for bearer debt exemption were included in the repeal legislation by
reference to I.R.C. § 163(0(2)(B) and have been amplified by recent treasury regulations. See infra
note 62 and accompanying text.
44 Interest would be exempt on an obligation in "registered" form if the U.S. payor received a
statement that the beneficial owner of the obligation was not a U.S. person. That statement could be
received from the beneficial owner or from a bank, securities clearing organization or other financial
institution holding customer's securities in the ordinary course of its trade or business. The state-
ment would not, however, have required identification of the beneficial owner. JoINT COMMITTEE
PRINT OF 1984, supra note 20, at 14. While this definition of registered debt was retained in the
repeal legislation itself, Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5(b), Q & A 9 requires identification of the
beneficial owner.
45 The main difference between H.R. 3025 and H.R. 4029 was the inclusion of the federal gov-
ernment and its agencies among those who could issue tax-free debt to foreigners. See supra note 38.
The repeal legislation as enacted allows the Treasury to issue its securities tax-free, but on the
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(2) Senate Proposal: Section 142 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984:6
Though the substantive provisions of this section were similar to those of
H.R. 3025 and S. 1557, section 142 called for a reduction in the with-
holding rate from thirty percent to five percent on an immediate basis,
with a phase-out in the rate to occur by June 30, 1988.' 7 This delayed
phase-out reflected Congressional concern for the future of the Antillean
economy, which would be adversely affected by an immediate repeal."
(3) Barnard bill (H.R. 4029):19 H.R. 4029 adopted an immediate re-
peal approach, but limited the repeal to Eurobond interest paid by
United States corporations. No exemption was to be provided for inter-
est paid to foreigners on registered bonds or on government or govern-
ment agency obligations."0
Each of the above proposals included:
-exceptions to the repeal for interest received by ten percent-or-more own-
ers of payor corporations or partnerships; 51
decision of then-Secretary Regan, the securities will be sold in "foreign-targeted" registered form
and not in bearer form. See infra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
46 H.R. 2163, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 142 (1984).
47 Industry did not favor this proposal, pointing out that even a low rate of withholding would
eliminate the advantage of Eurobond financing because the savings accruing from such financing
were generally less than 100 basis points. May 1, 1984 Hearings, supra note 3 at 89-9 1. Moreover,
they noted, combining the effects of a phased-in withholding with those of the income resourcing
rules would only exacerbate the problem. See supra note 37.
48 23 TAX NOTEs 552 (Apr. 30, 1984). Reports estimated that the Antillean government de-
rived as much as 25% of its annual budget through direct tax revenues received from Antillean
finance subsidiaries. This figure does not include the indirect revenues which resulted from in-
creased employment and support services. See infra note 198 and accompanying text; May 1, 1984
Hearings, supra note 3, at 118-25 (statement of Prime Minister Dominico Martina). Whether the
Senate proposal would have softened the blow to the Netherlands Antilles is doubtful; it was more
likely to halt Eurobond financings, because even a small rate of withholding could eliminate any cost
savings achieved by using the Eurobond market. See supra note 47. The repeal legislation as en-
acted does, however, provide some relief to the Antillean economy since companies cannot assume
debt in existence on the date of enactment. Thus, the Antillean economy will continue to derive tax
revenues from the servicing of that debt. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
49 H.R. 4029, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CoNG. REc. E4642 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983). Hearings
were held on H.R. 4029 in 1984. May 1, 1984 Hearings, supra note 3. For a description of H.tL
4029, see JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT OF 1984, supra note 20.
50 See supra note 45.
51 Interest on bearer or registered debt, if paid to a foreign investor who had a "direct ownership
interest" in the U.S. payor, would be ineligible for the exemption. A direct ownership interest would
exist, in the case of interest paid by a domestic corporation or a domestic partnership, if the investor
owned, directly or indirectly (using constructive ownership rules) (a) in the case of a domestic corpo-
ration, 10% or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote in that
corporation or (b) in the case of a domestic partnership, 10% or more of the capital or profits
interest of the partnership. JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT OF 1984, supra note 20, at 16.
Utilizing the attribution rules of I.R.C. § 318(a), as modified by I.RC. §§ 871(h)(3)(C)(i) and
(ii), this direct ownership restriction is embodied in the enacted legislation as I.R.C. § 871(h)(3).
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-exceptions to the repeal rules for interest received by controlled foreign
corporations5 2 and by foreign banks on extensions of credit pursuant to
loan agreements entered into in the ordinary course of business,5 3 and for
interest income "effectively connected" with the conduct of a United
States trade or business.
54
-provisions allowing the Secretary of the Treasury to remove the exemp-
tion where the exchange of information with other countries was deemed
inadequate;
55
-elimination of United States estate tax on obligations for which interest
was exempted.
56
(4) Joint Tax Committee Proposal. An excise and an income tax of two
Under I.R.C. § 871(h)(3), interest received by 10% owners is excluded from the definition of "port-
folio interest."
52 Under these proposals, the 30% withholding tax would be retained for interest paid on bearer
or registered debt of U.S. persons to a controlled foreign corporation (CFC). A CFC is a corpora-
tion in which more than 50% of the voting interest is owned by U.S. shareholders on any day in the
corporate tax year. LR.C. § 957(a). A U.S. shareholder is a U.S. person who actually or construc-
tively owns 10% or more of a foreign corporation's voting interest. .LC. § 951(b). The withhold-
ing tax was retained in this case to ensure that some tax would be paid because of the following prior
tax provisions allowing U.S. shareholders to use their CFCs to avoid taxes:
(1) Under prior law, dividends paid by a CFC which were attributable to interest on U.S.
loans were foreign source income. In effect, this allowed conversion of U.S. source income to foreign
source income and, consequently, resulted in a higher limitation on the foreign tax credit. This
provision was amended by the 1984 Act, however, so that such income now retains its U.S. source.
See supra note 37.
(2) A CFC could defer U.S. tax on its foreign source income if investment interest was less
than 10% of its gross income. Thus, current interest deductions could be taken by a U.S. debtor
even though the CFC could defer recognition of the interest income. The changes in the 1984 Act
remove such interest income from this provision by preventing its resourcing into foreign source
income. JOINT CoMMITrEE PRINT OF 1984, supra note 20, at 15.
Under the 1984 Act, portfolio interest paid to a CFC will be exempt unless the interest is paid
by a related person under I.R.C. § 864(d)(4). See infra note 68.
53 Withholding on interest paid to foreign banks in these cases would serve to discourage those
banks from lending to U.S. persons through offshore branches which were not subject to U.S. bank-
ing regulations, a practice of concern to the Federal Reserve Board. JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT OF
1984, supra note 20, at 15-16.
The 1984 Act retains this restriction, with an exception for interest paid on an obligation of the
U.S. government. .LRC. § 881(c)(3)(A).
54 Such income is subject to tax at the regular rates applicable to such a business. See supra note
13.
55 The information sought to be exchanged would generally relate to information from other
governments on tax evasion activities by U.S. persons. The removal of the exemption would apply
only to interest payments on future issuances of debt obligations and would continue only until the
Secretary has determined that sufficient information was being received to identify the recipient of
the interest. JOINT CoMMITrEE PRINT OF 1984, supra note 20, at 16.
The 1984 Act retains this provision in I.RLC. §§ 871(h)(5) and 881(c)(5).
56 JOINT COMMrrTEE PRINT OF 1984, supra note 20, at 15. Such treatment would be consistent
with the taxing scheme of the estate tax on nonresident aliens. The 1984 Act adopted this exclusion
in see. 127(d) of the 1984 Act, which amended I.RC. § 2105(b) (Property outside the U.S.-not
included in decedent's estate). See infra note 77.
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and one-half percent to three percent were each suggested in lieu of com-
plete repeal. Concerns over treaty conficts and fears that even a small
tax rate would eliminate the Eurobond advantage, however, resulted in
general disapproval of these proposals.5 7
The repeal legislation adopted in the 1984 Act differs somewhat
from each of these proposals, but most nearly follows theprovisions of
H.R. 3025 and S. 1557. Unlike those proposals, however, it excludes
assumed debt from the repeal provisions. The legislation enacted thus
also extend to issues of the federal government and governmental
agencies.
III. THE NEW LAW-SECTION 127 OF THE
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984
A. Statutory Provisions
Under the provisions enacted, complete repeal of the thirty percent
rate of withholding became effective on July 18, 1984.58 The repeal ap-
plies only to interest paid on obligations issued after the date of enact-
ment. 9 Thus, obligations in existence on that date cannot be assumed by
the United States parent without payment of the thirty percent withhold-
ing thereon. °
The exemption from withholding applies only to "portfolio interest"
paid to non-resident alien individuals and to foreign corporations with
respect to two categories of debt: bearer and registered.6 1 With respect
57 Rep. Stark believed that a low rate of withholding would be a good compromise to the compli-
ance and trade deficit problems associated with the total elimination of the 30% withholding tax.
He compared this proposal to the Japanese system, noting that the latter had managed to keep the
yen well-controlled. 24 TAX NoTEs 327 (Jul. 23, 1984).
Most observers, however, believed that even a 2-3% rate of withholding would severely hamper
the operation of the Eurobond market because it would increase the interest costs on financing be-
yond the savings accrued through the use of that market. Letter from William McClure, Esq. to the
Treasury Department. 23 TAx NoTEs 1025 (Jun. 4, 1984). Furthermore, it was feared that if the
2'/2-3% excise tax did not override the U.S.-N.A. treaty, it would have the effect of maintaining the
finance subsidiary system, with its related costs. Letter from Rep. Doug Barnard to Asst. Secretary
John Chapoton. 22 TAx NoTES 740 (Feb. 20, 1984).
58 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 648 (signed into law on July
18, 1984).
59 § 127(g) of the 1984 Act states: "Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the amend-
ments made by this section shall apply to interest received after the date of the enactment of this Act
with respect to obligations issued after such date, in taxable years ending after such date."
Congress excluded pre-existing obligations from the repeal legislation so as to give the N.A.
economy time to adjust to the effects of the legislation. EXPLANATION OF THE 1984 ACT, supra note
6, at 392.
60 CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 937 (1984) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT].
61 I.R.C. §§ 871(h)(1) and 881(c)(1).
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to bearer debt, I.R.C. § 871(h)(2)(A) defines "portfolio interest" as inter-
est paid on any obligation that is not in registered form and that is de-
scribed in § 163(f)(2)(B). An obligation is described in § 163(f)(2)(B) if:
(1) the obligation is sold under arrangements reasonably designed to pre-
vent sales (or resales in connection with the original issue) to United
States persons;
(2) interest on the obligation is payable only outside the United States and
its possessions; and
(3) the face of the obligation contains a statement that United States hold-
ers are subject to limitations under the United States income tax
laws.6
2
62 I.R.C. § 163(0(2)(B). These three requirements, known as the "foreign-targeted" exception
to the issuance of registered debt, are interpreted in Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-5(c)T(1) and (2)
(T.D. 7965,49 Fed. Reg. 33,230, reprinted in 1984-2 C.B. 38), and are effective for obligations issued
to foreign persons after September 21, 1984.
These temporary regulations add an additional requirement, not included in I.R.C. § 871 or
§ 881, that the obligations must be "registration-required" within the meaning of I.R.C.
§ 163(0(2)(A) in order to qualify as "portfolio interest" and to be eligible for the exemption from
withholding. In essence, this means that the obligations (1) cannot be issued by a natural person,
(2) must be of a type offered to the public, and (3) must have maturities of more than one year.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5(a), Q&A-1. See infra notes 107-24 and accompanying text for a
criticism of this requirement.
The determination of whether an obligation meets the requirements of I.R.C. § 163(f(2)(B) is
made on an obligation-by-obligation basis. An obligation originally issued in registered form but
later converted to bearer form will not meet the requirements of I.RC. § 163(f(2)(B). Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.163-5(c)T(1).
An obligation is considered to have been issued under arrangements reasonably designed to
ensure sale to non-United States persons if it meets the requirements of one of three paragraphs in
the Temporary Regulations. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-5(c)T(2)(i). The most common method of
satisfying the statute is where the obligation is offered for sale or resale only outside the United
States and its possessions, and is not required to be registered under the Securities Act of 1933
because it is intended for distribution to persons who are not U.S. persons. Prior to the issuance of
the obligations, the issuer, in reliance on written opinion of counsel, must have made a good faith
determination that the obligations need not be registered under the Securities Act of 1933 because
they are intended for distribution to non-U.S. persons. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-5(c)T(2)(i)(A).
Two other methods of satisfying the first requirement of I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(B) are (1) the use of
covenants by the underwriters and confirmations by the purchaser, physical delivery on presentation
of a certificate and no actual knowledge that the certificate is false or (2) issuance outside the United
States by an issuer that is not significantly engaged in interstate commerce where issuance occurs
through a branch located abroad in an active banking business. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-
5(c)T(2)(i)(B) and (C).
The second requirement of I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)0B), that interest be payable only outside of the
United States and its possessions, is satisfied where payment of such interest can be made only upon
presentation of a coupon or upon demand for payment outside of the United States and its posses-
sions. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-5(c)T(2)(v). Payments of interest by transfer into an account
maintained by the payee in the United States or mailed to a U.S. address will not qualify if the
interest is paid on an obligation issued by a U.S. person or certain other issuers. Id. Cf Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5(a), Q&A-2 and -5, which make a similar requirement in order to avoid
backup withholding. See infra note 83.
Payment may be made to the account of a financial institution in the United States, however, if
the payment is merely a step in the clearance of funds and if the payment is promptly credited to an
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 6:930(1984)
The term "portfolio interest" also includes interest paid on an obli-
gation in registered form63 where the United States payor has received a
statement that the beneficial owner of the obligations is not a United
States person.64 The required statement may be made by the beneficial
owner of the obligation, a securities clearing organization, a bank, or
other financial institution that holds customers' securities in the ordinary
course of trade or business.65
account maintained outside the United States by the financial institution or by the person for which
the financial institution collected the interest. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-5(c)T(2)(v)(B)(2) (T.D.
8046, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,522, reprinted in 1985-40 I.R.B. 9).
Interest may be payable at the office of the issuer or its U.S. paying agent, however, if the
payment of the full amount of interest at the offices of the foreign paying agent becomes illegal or is
effectively precluded due to the imposition of exchange controls. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-
5(c)T(2)(v)(B)(2).
In order to satisfy the third requirement of I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(B), a bearer obligation must bear
the following legend on the face of the obligation and on any interest coupons which may be de-
tached therefrom:
Any United States person who holds this obligation will be subject to limitations under the
United States income tax laws, including the limitations provided in Sections 1650) and 1287(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-5(c)T(l)(ii)(B). See infra note 89 for a discussion of these sanctions on
U.S. persons. A bearer bond may be exempt from the third requirement, however, if the obligation
meets the interstate commerce exception or is represented by a temporary global security. Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.163-5(c)T(l)(ii)(B).
63 For purposes of the repeal legislation, the term "registered form" has the same meaning given
such term in § 163(f). I.R.C. §§ 871(h)(6) and 881(c)(6).
An obligation is in "registered form" if (I) the obligation is registered as to both principal and
any stated interest, and transfer of the obligation may be effected only by the surrender of the old
instrument and either the reissuance by the issuer of the old instrument to the new holder or the
issuance by the issuer of a new instrument to the new holder, or (2) the right to the principal of, and
stated interest on, the obligation may be transferred only through a book-entry system. Treas. Reg.
§§ 5f.163-1(a) and 5f.103-1(c)(l).
An obligation is considered transferable through a book-entry system if the ownership of an
interest in the obligation is required to be reflected in a book entry, whether or not physical securities
are issued. A book entry is a record of ownership that identifies the owner of an interest in the
obligation. Treas. Reg. § 5f.103-1(c)(2).
An obligation is not considered to be in registered form, however, if it may be converted into
bearer form. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-12T(b)(1). See also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5(c),
Q&A-18.
64 I.R.C. §§ 871(h)(2)(B) and 881(c)(2)(B). In order to qualify as "portfolio interest," the regu-
lations add to the statutory language the requirement that the obligation be "registration-required"
within the meaning of I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(A). Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5(b), Q&A-8. See infra
notes 107-24 and accompanying text for a criticism of this requirement.
65 I.R.C. § 871(h)(4).
If the initial purchaser is an individual, the required statement must be signed by the beneficial
owner under penalties of perjury certifying that such owner is not a U.S. person and providing the
name and address of the beneficial owner. Form W-8, or a substantially similar form, must be used
for this purpose. The withholding agent must receive the statement in the year in which interest is
paid or in either of the two preceeding years and must retain the statement for at least four years.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5(b), Q&A-9.
If the initial purchaser is a custodian (i.e., a securities clearing organization, bank or other
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Interest will not be "portfolio interest," and therefore will not be
exempt, if-
(1) the recipient owns, directly or indirectly, ten percent or more of the
payor; 6or
(2) the recipient is a controlled foreign corporation 67 and the interest is
paid by a related person;68 or
(3) the interest is received by a foreign bank on an extension of credit
made pursuant to a loan entered into in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, unless the interest is received on an obligation of the United
States; 6 9 or
(4) the interest received is effectively connected with the conduct of a
United States trade or business.
70
A withholding agent has an explicit duty to withhold only if the agent
knows, or has reason to know, that the interest is subject to the tax be-
cause it is not "portfolio interest.
71
financial institution that holds customers' securities in the ordinary course of its trade or business),
the statement, signed under penalties of perjury by an authorized representative of the custodian
institution must state that the institution has received a Form W-8 or similar form from the benefi-
cial owner or from another financial institution which received the statement from the beneficial
owner. Id
With two exceptions, discussed at Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5(b), Q&A-10, a withholding
agent must withhold tax under I.R.C. §§ 1441(a) and 1442(a) if the required statement is not re-
ceived, even if the interest otherwise qualifies as "portfolio interest." Id
66 I.R.C. §§ 871(h)(3) and 881(c)(3)(B). See supra note 51; see also infra note 74.
67 See supra note 52 for the definition of a CFC.
68 1.RLC. § 881(c)(3)(C). The legislation as enacted differs from the Senate provision by exempt-
ing interest paid to a CFC ('if otherwise eligible for the exemption) unless paid by a "related person"
(as defined in 1.RLC. § 864(d)(4)). EXPLANATION OF THE 1984 Acr, supra note 6, at 395-96.
A "related person" under I.R.C. § 864(d)(4) means (A) any person who is a related person
(within the meaning of I.R.C. § 267(b)), and (B) any U.S. shareholder (defined in I.R.C. § 951(b))
and any person who is a related person (within the meaning of I.R.C. § 267(b)) to a U.S. share-
holder. This definition is quite broad.
Under I.R.C. § 881(c)(4), where portfolio interest is received by a CFC from other than a re-
lated person, the following subpart F relief provisions will not apply:
(1) L.LC. § 954(b)(3)-exception where foreign base company income is less than 10%; (2) I.R.C.
§ 954(b)(4)-exception where CFC not formed or availed of to avoid tax; and (3) exceptions to the
foreign personal holding company income rules in I.R.C. § 954(c), including (a) I.R.C.
§ 954(c)(3)(B)-exception for certain income derived in the active conduct of a trade or business; (b)
1LRC. § 954(c)(3)(C)-exception for certain income derived from an insurance company; and
(c) I.R.C. § 954(c)(4)(A) and (B)-exception for certain income received from related persons. This
provision ensures that such interest will be taxed currently to the CFC's U.S. shareholders. In addi-
tion, under new I.R.C. § 90 4(g), such income will retain its source as U.S. source income. Also, any
foreign taxes imposed on such income may be subject to a separate foreign tax credit limitation
under new I.R.C. § 904(d).
69 1R.C. § 881(c)(3)(A). See infra note 74.
70 See supra note 13.
71 Such duty would arise where the withholding agent knows, or has reason to know that the
recipient "is a controlled foreign corporation related to the payor, has a direct ownership interest in
the U.S. payor, or (except in the case of interest paid on an obligation to the United States) is a bank
and the interest is received on an extension of credit made pursuant to a loan agreement entered into
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Notwithstanding the allowance of bearer obligations, the Secretary
of the Treasury is empowered to require registration of obligations72 and
to remove the exemption with respect to residents of a foreign country
where he deems the exchange of information between the United States
and that country inadequate.73  Moreover, the conference report autho-
rizes and encourages the Secretary to examine and prohibit "back-to-
back" loans, transactions which attempt to circumvent the restrictions
on ten percent owners and on foreign banks by interposing unrelated
parties. 74
In order to resolve the issues raised by the Service in audits of fi-
nance subsidiaries, namely whether or not the subsidiary was valid and
effective for tax purposes,7 5 Congress provided that finance subsidiaries
in existence on the date of enactment would be recognized as valid corpo-
rations and that the finance subsidiary's Eurobond obligations would be
treated as its own obligations and not those of its domestic parent.76
in the ordinary course of the bank's business." EXPLANATION OF THE 1984 AcT, supra note 6, at
397. See I.R.C. § 1441(c)(9), which provides:
In the case of portfolio interest (within the meaning of [section] 871(h)(2)) no tax shall be
required to be deducted and withheld from such interest unless the person required to deduct
and withhold tax from such interest knows, or has reason to know, that such interest is not
portfolio interest by reason of section 871(h)(3).
72 § 127(f) of the 1984 Act amended I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(C)(i) to provide that the Secretary may
require registration of bearer obligations. Prior to the amendment, the Secretary could require regis-
tration of bearer obligations only where such obligations were determined to be used frequently in
avoiding federal taxes.
73 I.R.C. §§ 871(h)(5) and 881(c)(5); see supra note 55.
74 In a back-to-back loan, a foreign affiliate of a U.S. taxpayer or a foreign bank lends money to
an unrelated foreign party which then relends the money at a discount to the U.S. taxpayer. EXPLA-
NATION OF THE 1984 AcT, supra note 6, at 395.
75 See supra note 36.
76 Section 127(g)(3) of the 1984 Act; EXPLANATION OF THE 1984 AcT, supra note 6, at 397-98.
Specifically, if certain requirements are met, interest paid to the foreign finance subsidiary will be
treated as paid to a resident of the country in which the CFC is incorporated. The requirements are
(1) that the CFC was in existence on or before June 22, 1984; (2) that the principal purpose of the
CFC on the date of the interest payment was issuing its obligations, holding short-term obligations
and lending proceeds of such obligations to affiliates (L e., persons related to it under I.R.C. § 482);
(3) that the obligations on which interest is paid are obligations of a U.S. affiliate that were issued
before June 22, 1984 and (4) that on the date on which interest is paid, the payee satisfies the require-
ments included in four revenue rulings: Rev. Rul. 69-377, 1969-2 C.B. 231; Rev. Rul. 69-501, 1969-
2 C.B. 233; Rev. Rul. 70-645, 1970-2 C.B. 273; and Rev. Rul. 73-110, 1973-1 C.B. 454. Sections
127(g)(3) and 121(b)(2)(D) of the 1984 Act. Although other requirements are listed in these rulings,
the thrust of the rulings is that the debt-to-equity ratio of the finance subsidiary at all times must not
exceed 5:1. See supra note 22.
This provision, "grandfathering" certain finance subsidiary's obligations outstanding on June
22, 1984, is contained in see. 127(g)(3) of the 1984 Act and amends I.R.C. § 881 in a non-code
provision. By grandfathering issues in existence on June 22, 1984 and by setting the effective date of
the legislation at the date of enactment (July 18, 1984), however, Congress inadvertantly left open a
"window period" for issues floated between those two dates. See infra notes 125-47 and accompany-
ing text. For examples of private letter rulings applying the grandfathering rule of Act sec.
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Portfolio obligations whose interest is exempt from withholding are
also exempt from United States estate tax if held by a nonresident at
death.7 7
B. Compliance Issues and Concerns Over Tax Evasion
The Eurobond market is largely composed of bearer obligations be-
cause of foreigners' demand for anonymity.7 8 Throughout the congres-
sional hearings on the repeal legislation, concerns were voiced over the
possibility of increased tax evasion by United States citizens through the
use of such bearer obligations.79 The inclusion of safeguards to thwart
such evasion, along with assurances by the Treasury to monitor and re-
port to Congress on compliance with the Act's provisions, however, ap-
parently satisfied enough of the legislators to allow passage of the
measure.80 Yet, even though the repeal legislation had passed, regula-
tions in existence on the date of enactment effectively precluded direct
issuance of bearer debt because such regulations required "backup with-
holding" of twenty percent unless the foreign person provided his name
and address to the Treasury.81 Thus, direct Eurobond issues were fore-
127(g)(3), see L.T.R. 8527010 (Mar. 22, 1985) and L.T.R. 8530002 (Apr. 16, 1985); see also L.T.R.
8449060 (Sept. 6, 1984).
77 I.R.C. § 2105(b)(3) provides that such obligations constitute property not within the United
States for estate tax purposes. Accordingly, such obligations are not included in the decedent's gross
estate under I.R.C. § 2103 and are not subject to estate tax under I.R.C. § 2101.
78 Demands for anonymity do not necessarily reflect tax-evasion motives. Many foreigners, es-
pecially citizens of politically unstable countries, seek anonymity because of fear of confiscation of
assets. May 1, 1984 Hearings, supra note 3, at 253.
79 See infra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
80 During the 1984 hearings, the Treasury stated its belief that the regulations, enacted as part of
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) to discourage the holding of bearer
bonds by U.S. persons, would be effective in coping with any tax evasion problems associated with
the repeal legislation. See infra note 109 and text accompanying note 176. The treasury regulations
issued on August 17, 1984 on the repeal legislation were based on the safeguards contained in the
TEFRA regulations. Furthermore, then-Treasury Secretary Regan promised that the Treasury
would monitor compliance and report to Congress on the effect of the regulations within 90 days of
the first interest payment on a "foreign-targeted" issue of Treasury securities.
81 "Backup withholding" refers to a method that Congress adopted in the Interest and Dividend
Tax Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 369, to deal with taxpayer failure to submit certification
statements and to report other information such as taxpayer identification numbers. Unless taxpay-
ers comply with such requirements by furnishing certification statements or identification numbers
where required, the payor of the interest is required to withhold at a rate of 20% of the payment.
I.R.C. § 3406(a). The backup withholding system of I.R.C. § 3406 applies only to "reportable pay-
ments" made after 1983 to payees who have failed to furnish the required reporting information.
Generally, "reportable payments" subject to backup withholding include payments of principal
or interest on an obligation if such payments are required to be reported on an information return
under I.RC. §§ 6045 (principal) or 6049(a) (interest). I.R.C. §§ 3406(b)(2)(A)(i) and (3)(C).
Under I.R.C. § 6049(a), any person who makes payments of interest aggregating $10 or more
during a calendar year, or who collects interest as a nominee and makes such payments, is subject to
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stalled until August 22, 1984 when, under great pressure from Congress,
United States corporate executives and investment bankers, Treasury is-
sued temporary regulations on the repeal legislation. 2
an information reporting obligation. For purposes of I.R.C. § 6049, "interest" includes, among
other things, interest on an obligation in registered form or of a type offered to the public, 1.1LC.
§ 6049(b)(1)(A), but does not include interest on amounts subject to withholding under .LR.C.
§§ 1441 or 1442 or amounts which would have been subject to those sections but for the fact that
(a) such income is from foreign sources; or (b) the payor is exempt from I.R.C. § 1441(a) by reason
of I.R.C. § 1441(c) or a tax treaty. I.R.C. §§ 6049(b)(2)(C)(ii) and 6049(b)(5). Moreover, Treas.
Reg. § 1.6049-5(b)(1)(vi)(B)(3) requires that the payment be exempt from I.R.C. § 1441(a) not only
under I.R.C. § 1441(c), but also under paragraph (a) or (f) of Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-4.
Prior to the 1984 Act, interest paid to foreign investors through international finance subsidiar-
ies was exempt from information reporting under I.R.C. § 6049 since it was from foreign sources
and, therefore, was not "interest" as defined therein. Accordingly, under I.R.C. § 3406(b)(2)(A)Ci),
such payments were also exempt from backup withholding since they were not "reportable pay-
ments." Payments of principal to foreign investors through international finance subsidiaries were
exempt from information reporting and backup withholding under I.R.C. § 6045(a) and Treas. Reg.
§§ 35a.9999-3A and 35a.9999-3, Q&A-37.
The repeal legislation amended the relevant Code sections in order to permit direct issuances of
Eurobonds by U.S. companies. However, prior to amendment of the existing regulations, two provi-
sions therein would have subjected payments of principal and interest to information reporting and
backup withholding, thus preventing companies from utilizing the repeal legislation until the amend-
ment of the regulations.
The first problem with the existing regulations was that interest payments paid by U.S. compa-
nies would be considered "interest" under I.R.C. § 6049 since those payments were neither foreign
source income nor were they exempt from I.R.C. § 1441(a) under paragraph (a) or (f) of § 1.1441-4.
(While the addition of I.R.C. § 1441(c)(9) satisfied the Code's requirements under § 6049, it did not
satisfy those of the Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-5(b)(1)(vi)(B)(3)). As the interest payments would have
been subject to information reporting under I.R.C. § 6049, they would have also been subject to
backup withholding under I.R.C. § 3406.
The second problem arose on the issuance of Temp. Treas. Regs. § 35a.9999-5 where, to the
dismay of many tax practitioners, the Service took the position that principal payments on bearer
and foreign-targeted registered obligations were "reportable payments" (and therefore subject to
information reporting) under I.R.C. § 6045 where such payments were made by dual custodians.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5, Q&A-7 and -17. Such payments would also have been subject to
backup withholding under I.R.C. § 3406. Payments of interest and principal on registered obliga-
tions were not subject to information reporting and backup withholding under existing regulations,
since the payee's name and identity were disclosed. The use of registered obligations, however, was
inconsistent with the concept of investor anonymity associated with bearer obligations and such a
requirement thus threatened to halt activity in the Eurobond market. 23 TAX NOTES 742 (May 14,
1984) and 24 TAX NOTES 7 (Jul. 2, 1984). See also Repeal of the Withholding Tax, supra note 5, at
51.
In response to the two problems in the regulations, the Service promptly issued new regulations
which (1) exempted payments of portfolio interest from information reporting and backup withhold-
ing and (2) exempted principal payments from backup withholding. However, these regulations
retained the information reporting requirements with respect to principal payments by dual custodi-
ans unless such custodians have documentary evidence that the payee is not a U.S. person. See infra
note 83.
82 The new temporary regulations exempt, from information reporting and backup withholding,
interest and principal payments made by U.S. issuers or their agents on the three types of obligations
where interest paid thereon qualifies for portfolio interest within the meaning of I.R.C. §§ 871(h)(2)
or 881(c)(2). Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5 (T.D. 7967, 49 Fed. Reg. 33,239, reprinted in 1984-2
Repeal of Thirty Percent Withholding Tax
6:930(1984)
The temporary regulations generally exempt, from information re-
porting and backup withholding procedures, interest and principal pay-
ments made by United States corporate issuers or their agents on
obligations in bearer,3 foreign-targeted registered8 4 and foreign non-
targeted registered form,85 as long as the payor does not have actual
C.B. 38) deals with the application of backup withholding and information reporting under the
repeal legislation. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-4T (T.D. 7966, 49 Fed. Reg. 33,228, reprinted in
1984-2 C.B. 324, amended by T.D. 7972, 49 Fed. Reg. 34,340, reprinted in 1984-2 C.B. 327) deals
with payments made by U.S. and foreign banks and brokers. For a thorough analysis of these regu-
lations, see US. Income Withholding Tax-Foreign Persons, 341 TAx MGM'T PORTFOLIO (BNA) A-
20 to -20(6).
83 As to obligations issued in bearer form, where interest and principal are paid by the company
or its paying agent outside the United States, no information reporting or backup withholding is
required unless the issuer or its agent has actual knowledge that the payee is a U.S. person. Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5(a), Q&A-2, -7. Whether a payment of interest is made outside the United
States is determined under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-3, Q&A-37, but in no case will interest be
considered to be paid outside the United States if it is paid to a U.S. address, whether by mail or
electronic transfer. Id See also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5(a), Q&A-3 through -6.
Payments of interest made outside the United States by a custodian, nominee or other agent of
the payee with respect to such payment are generally not subject to information reporting under
I.R.C. § 6049. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-4T, Q&A-5(ii). Such payments are therefore not sub-
ject to backup withholding under I.R.C. § 3406. Id at Q&A-5(iv). The same rules apply to pay-
ments of principal and proceeds of sale. Id at Q&A-5(v) and Q&A-2.
Payments made by dual custodians (L/e., foreign branches of U.S. banks or brokers, CFC's or a
foreign person 50% or more of whose income over a three-year period was effectively connected with
a United States trade or business) are not subject to backup withholding. Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 35a.9999-4T, Q&A-5(iv). The payments will, however, be subject to information reporting under
I.R.C. § 6049 unless the custodian has documentary evidence in its files that the customer either is
not a U.S. person or is otherwise exempt. Documentary evidence necessary to satisfy this require-
ment is defined at Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-4T, Q&A-5(iii).
Finally, payments of principal and interest by a United States custodian, nominee or other agent
will be exempt from information reporting and backup withholding only if the custodian receives a
statement signed under penalties of perjury that the beneficial owner is not a U.S. person. Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-4T, Q&A-3.
The question of the application of backup withholding to dual status custodians is still under
consideration by the Treasury; withholding may be imposed in the future on such custodians on a
prospective basis only. Id at Q&A-5(iv).
84 As to foreign-targeted registered obligations, see infra note 98, payments of principal and
interest are exempt from backup withholding and information reporting where the registered owner
(if it is outside the United States and is a financial institution holding customers' securities in the
ordinary course of business) certifies to the payor as to each payment that the beneficial owner is not
a U.S. person. Moreover, the payor must not have actual knowledge that the beneficial owner is a
U.S. person. The beneficial owner's identity, however, need not be disclosed. Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 35a.9999-5(b), Q&A-12 to -17, as amended by T.D. 8046, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,522, reprinted in 1985-
40 I.R.B. 9.
Where the payment is made by a dual custodian, such payments are subject to information
reporting unless the custodian has documentary evidence in its files that the payee is not a US.
person. Id at Q&A-16, Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-4T, Q&A-5.
85 Payments of portfolio interest on foreign non-targeted registered obligations will be exempt
from backup withholding and information reporting only if the payee provides a W-8 or substitute
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knowledge that the payee is a United States person.8 6  The regulations
distinguish between payments made by foreign offices of foreign financial
institutions and those made by foreign offices of United States financial
institutions, (dual custodians); the former are exempt from both informa-
tion reporting and backup withholding requirements, while the latter are
subject to information reporting requirements, but are currently exempt
from backup withholding.87 Many securities officials have balked at the
requirements established by the regulations, claiming that they are oner-
ous and that compliance with them will prove costly. 88
A separate set of temporary regulations, also issued on August 22,
1984, describes sanctions on issuers and holders of "registration-re-
quired" obligations which are not in registered form.89 Significantly,
these regulations delete a prior provision which allowed United States
form to the payor and the payor does not have actual knowledge that the payee is a U.S. person.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5(b), Q&A-9 to -11.
Payments of principal on a registered obligation by a paying agent are exempt from backup
withholding if the payor receives a statement described in Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(g)(1). Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-1, Q&A -55. As to foreign and dual status custodians, such payments will be
exempt from information reporting if the statement described in Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(g)(1) is re-
ceived. However, such payments will not be subject to backup withholding. Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 35a.9999-4T, Q&A-1, -2.
86 See supra notes 82-85.
87 Ia.
88 Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.163-5(c)T(2) and 35a.9999-4T and -5 impose many restrictions on
issuers of bearer obligations and on foreign offices and subsidiaries of U.S. banks. In order to qualify
as "portfolio interest" and to avoid the imposition of sanctions, backup withholding and information
reporting, these parties must obtain documentation that the payee is not a U.S. person and must send
confirmations to the purchaser stating that the purchaser must represent the same. Critics state that
these requirements are costly and inefficient and that they will put U.S. branches of banks at a
disadvantage relative to their foreign counterparts, who are not subject to such requirements. Letter
from John Rolf III of Citibank, New York to the Treasury, contained in 25 TAX NOTES 764 (Nov.
26, 1984); Letter from the Securities Industry Association to the Treasury, 25 TAx NOTES 610 (Nov.
12, 1984).
89 An issuer of a registration-required obligation that is not in registered form (which mainly
includes bearer obligations which fail to meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(B) and the
regulations issued thereunder) will be subject to "issuer sanctions." These sanctions include: (1) de-
nial of interest deductions on such obligations, I.R.C. § 163(f)(1) and Treas. Reg. § 1.163-5; (2) im-
position of an excise tax of 1% of the principal amount of such obligations multiplied by the number
of calendar years the obligations will be outstanding, I.R.C. § 4701(a); and (3) denial of an earnings
and profit adjustment under I.R.C. § 312(m).
U.S. holders of a registration-required obligation not in registered form are subject to statutory
"holder sanctions" including: (1) denial of capital gain treatment upon the sale of the obligation at a
gain, I.R.C. § 165(j) and Treas. Reg. § 1.165-12T; (2) denial of loss deduction upon the sale of the
obligation at a loss, I.R.C. § 1287(a) and Treas. Reg. § 1.1287-IT; and (3) denial of the exemption
for interest income under I.R.C. § 1030). An exception to the sanctions exists if the U.S. person
holds such obligation through a financial institution that reports any interest collected on behalf of
its customers to the Service. The holder must establish a reporting relationship with a financial
institution within 30 days of the date of purchase of the bearer obligation. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.165-
12T(c)(1) and 1.1287-1T(c).
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firms to sell a portion of a registered issue in the United States in a form
that could later be converted for foreign sale as bearer debt. 0 Thus, in-
stead of being able to issue one security that could be bought and sold in
both the United States and abroad, a firm must now issue two separate
types of securities. Officials in the securities industry contend that this
regulation will severely hamper the creation of a secondary market for
bearer Eurobond debt and the development of a truly integrated mar-
ket.9 1 These individuals (and their tax advisors) further believe that the
regulations place restrictions on the raising of foreign capital which Con-
gress did not intend when it approved the repeal legislation.92 Conver-
sion restrictions and certification requiring the disclosure of the
investor's identity on registered obligations are two areas in which critics
contend that the Service has effectively "legislated" the rules, and in so
doing, has restricted the broad repeal which Congress enacted.
C Prohibition on Issuance of Bearer Debt
by the Federal Government and its Agencies
From a marketing standpoint, the most attractive Eurobond obliga-
tion is bearer debt. As noted above, however, these obligations are
thought to carry with them a higher potential for tax evasion.93 Thus,
certain members of Congress feared that the Treasury, a driving force
behind the repeal legislation, might attempt to issue bearer debt in its
efforts to fund the national deficit at a cheaper cost.94 To these individu-
als, the federal government was essentially condoning tax evasion by its
issuance of bearer debt. After informal meetings and correspondence be-
90 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-5(c)T(2)(vi), (issued Sept. 1983) described the conditions under
which a registered obligation could be converted to bearer form. T.D. 7965, containing the § 163
regulations which superceded Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-5, deleted this provision "because of con-
cern that this conversion rule would have created a substantial market of bearer paper that would be
more readily available to U.S. persons." An obligation will not be considered to be in registered
form if, under any circumstances, it can be converted into bearer form. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-
5(c)T(1); see also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-12T(b)(1).
91 164 DAILY REP. FOR ExncUTWEs (BNA), K-1 (Aug. 23, 1984). Once again, however, a
faction developed in the securities industry. While other firms claimed that this restriction would
thwart the integration of the market, First Boston and Morgan Stanley supported the nonconver-
tibility decision. In a letter to Treasury Secretary Regan, the Co-Chairman of First Boston stated
that (1) the rule has had no adverse impact to date and (2) continued agitation by the securities
industry may cause a congressional backlash which might result in the removal of the benefits of the
repeal legislation. Letter from Yves-Andre Istel to Treasury Secretary Regan, contained in 25 TAx
NoTs 1120 (Dec. 17, 1984).
92 Critics from the securities industry voiced their objections to these regulations at the January
28, 1985 hearings on the regulations. See 26 TAx NoTEs 404 (Feb. 4, 1985) for a summary of these
proceedings.
93 See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
94 24 TAx NoTEs 325 (Jul. 23, 1984) (remarks of spokesman for Rep. Doug Barnard).
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tween Congress and the Treasury, and concurrent with the proposal of a
"sense of the Senate" resolution prohibiting such issuance of bearer debt
by the Treasury, then-Secretary Donald Regan made assurances to Con-
gress on August 16, 1984, that Treasury debt would not be sold to for-
eigners in bearer form.95 The regulations issued on August 22, 1984 then
extended this restriction on issuance of bearer obligations to government-
owned or sponsored agencies.9 6 Finally, on September 7, 1984, Regan
announced that the restriction would also apply to any security in which
"more than 50% of the income, or collateral, supporting the instrument
consists of income or principal of a U.S. Government security."
9 7
Refusing to permit the issuance of government obligations in bearer
form, Treasury created the foreign-targeted registered obligation.9"
Although securities experts initially viewed the prospect of success in
95 Statement of former Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, reported in 24 TAX NOTES 734 (Aug.
20, 1984); see infra note 98. The "sense of the Senate" resolution appears at 130 CoNG. Rac.
S10,448 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1984).
96 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-5(c)T(1).
97 Treas. News Release 2835 (Sept. 7, 1984), reprinted at 84-10 CCH 6871; Treas. News Re-
lease 2847 (Sept. 9, 1984), reprinted at 84-10 CCH 6872. The Secretary of the Treasury is granted
authority under I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(C)(i) to specify by regulation which obligations are not eligible for
the foreign-targeted exception to the registration rules. In essence, the Secretary has the power to
require registration of obligations that would otherwise be eligible for issuance as bearer obligations.
Pursuant to such authority, the Treasury will be issuing regulations implementing this provision.
Obligations which may not be issued in bearer form will include securities issued by government
agencies and other securities in which "more than 50% of the income, or collateral, supporting the
instrument consists of income or principal of a U.S. Government security." 24 TAx NOTES 1110
(Sept. 17, 1984). This restriction is aimed at thwarting attempts made by investment houses and
other financial institutions to repackage Treasury obligations in a form eligible for issuance in bearer
form. Prior to notice of the regulations, however, Salomon Bros. sold a $7 billion issue of Certifi-
cates of Accrual on Treasury Securities (CATS), bearer securities backed by Treasury obligations.
lad at 1103-04. These obligations, grandfathered by the effective date stated in the Treasury Release
(Sept. 7, if the obligations are issued by Sept. 21, 1984), will be unique in the market since Treasury
has denied eligibility for the use of bearer form to later issuances of such securities. 24 TAx NOTES
1226 (Sept. 24, 1984). For an example of a ruling applying the Sept. 7, 1984 grandfather date, see
L.T.R. 8506120 (Nov. 20, 1984). Additionally, on Sept. 26, 1984, Rep. Marty Russo introduced a
bill, H.R. 6315, which would impose withholding on anyone who repackages U.S. government debt
for resale in bearer form. 130 CONG. REC. H10,365 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1984).
98 Treasury adopted the "foreign-targeted" registered security because of concerns over tax eva-
sion on bearer bonds. These securities, which are registered in street name and targeted to foreign
purchasers, feature an annual coupon (familiar to Europeans) and use a special certification so that
the beneficial owner need only state that he is not a citizen or resident of the U.S. The beneficial
owner need not, however, reveal his identity so long as the registerd owner is a financial institution.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5(b), Q&A-12 to -17, as amended by T.D. 8046, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,522,
reprinted in 1985-40 I.R.B. 9. This certification must be made at issuance and prior to each interest
payment. For 45 days after the initial issuance of the obligations, they may not be resold in the U.S.
market. Bids for the securities are accepted only by the Federal Reserve Bank in New York and
only from overseas institutions (including foreign branches of U.S. institutions). Finally, bidders
must certify that, as of the date of issuance, the notes are not being acquired for, or for resale to, a
U.S. person. Treasury Announcement, reported in 24 TAx NOTES 1110 (Sept 17, 1984).
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marketing Treasury debt in foreign-targeted registered form as dismal,
such predictions have not been accurate: two offerings of these treasury
securities made subsequent to the passage of the repeal legislation have
been substantially overbid by foreign purchasers.99
Government agencies such as the Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation and the Federal Home Loan Bank had hoped to capitalize on the
lower interest rates available through the issuance of tax-free bearer se-
curities in the Eurobond market. Since the new regulations prohibited
the agencies from issuing debt in bearer form, however, they were forced
to use foreign-targeted registered form, generally thought to be less at-
tractive in the Eurobond market. 1°° These agencies, in an effort to raise
cheaper funds to finance the housing industry, also sought to issue non-
governmental mortgage pass-through certificates in bearer form to for-
eigners. 10 1 The temporary regulations, however, initially took the posi-
tion that such obligations were not exempt from the thirty percent
withholding tax because the underlying securities were not "registration-
required" obligations under I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(A). °2 Commentators ar-
99 Some securities experts believed that the failure of the Treasury to market bearer obligations,
combined with the method of sale used (Le., auction versus the use of dealer/brokers) would result in
a very low demand for the issues. These persons noted that up to 80% of the demand for the first
issuance of Treasury obligations (made on October 24, 1984) would be politically-based. Bus. WK.,
Oct. 22, 1984, at 129.
The October 24, 1984 auction of $1 billion in 3-year, 1-month notes was successful, with bids
outnumbering issuances by 4 to 1. Due to the annual interest payment feature, Treasury estimates
that it will save $3.2 million in interest over the life of the bonds. Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1984, at 16,
col. 1. The second auction, on November 28, 1984, featured $1 billion of 5-year, 2-month 11%
Series H notes. Bids tendered for this issue amounted to $2.1 billion. 25 TAx NoTEs 1095 (Dec. 17,
1984).
100 Obligations issued in bearer form by a governmental agency are not considered to have been
issued pursuant to arrangements reasonably designed to ensure sale to non-U.S. persons. Temp.
Reg. § 1.163-5(c)T(l). On November 7, 1984, Fannie Mae announced that it would sell $300 million
of 7-year, 11.5% debentures in foreign-targeted registered form. This compares with a $500 million
domestic issue made in October 1984 at 12.15%. 217 DAILY REP. FOR ExEcuTIVEs (BNA) G-1
(Nov. 8, 1984).
101 Mortgage pass-through certificates are bonds whose underlying securities are a pool of real
estate mortgages held by a trust Letter from Lawrence D. Fink of First Boston Corp. to the Treas-
ury, contained in 25 TAX NoTEs 611 (Nov. 12, 1984).
102 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5, Q&A-1 and -8 state that for a bearer obligation to be a
portfolio debt instrument which qualifies for repeal of the withholding, the obligation must "be a
registration-required obligation within the meaning of I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(A) but for the fact that it is
described in I.R.C. § 163(f(2)(B)." In other words, bearer bonds issued under the "foreign-
targeted" exception rules of I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(B) qualify for exclusion from registration require-
ments, but the remaining I.RC. § 163(f)(2)(A) obligations do not because they are not considered
"registration-required." These latter issues include debt obligations (1) issued by a natural person;
(2) of a type not offered to the public; or (3) with maturities of not more than one year. Interest paid
on these obligations "is not portfolio interest." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5, A-1, -8. See infra
notes 108-09. Mortgage pass-through certificates were originally excluded from the repeal legisla-
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gued, however, that the Service's exclusion of mortgage pass-through
certificates from the benefits of the repeal legislation was inconsistent
with both congressional intent and with the statutory language of the
1984 Act.10 3 The critics' arguments ultimately persuaded the Treasury
Department: on August 20, 1985, Treasury issued temporary regulations
which provide that such obligations will be considered "registration-re-
quired" within the meaning of I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(A) without regard to
the status of the underlying obligations.04 Accordingly, interest payable
on mortgage pass-through certificates will now qualify for the repeal leg-
islation, since that interest is considered "portfolio interest."'' 0 One un-
tion because the underlying obligations for such certificates are generally obligations of homeowners,
Le., "natural persons."
103 Experts in the foreign-taxation field note that Congress, in enacting sec. 127 of the 1984 Act,
referred only to the requirements of .LR.C. § 163(f)(2)(B) in defining portfolio interest. The lan-
guage of the statute, they argue, does not refer to I.R.C. § 162(f)(2)(A), nor does the legislative
history indicate that Congress intended to exclude obligations described therein. See infra note 114
and accompanying text. Moreover, on December 31, 1984, the Joint Committee on Taxation re-
leased the EXPLANATION OF THE 1984 Acr, supra note 6, which generally indicates the Congres-
sional intent behind the provisions of the 1984 Act. The publication states, "Congress intended that
interest.., on publicly-traded mortgage pass-through securities be eligible for the exemption from
the 30% tax. Congress considers these securities to be registration-required under the TEFRA com-
pliance rules." Id at 396.
The Service's interpretation on mortgage pass-through securities was opposed by the Public
Securities Association, the Savings Institute, First Boston, Fannie Mae, the American Bankers Asso-
ciation, The American Bar Association, and the National Association of Realtors, which called the
Treasury's interpretation "discriminatory" because, they argued, it would result in higher mortgage
rates and fewer home purchases. 25 TAx NOTES 1190 (Dec. 24, 1984) and 25 TAX NOTES 1066
(Dec. 17, 1984).
Reps. Gibbons and Conable, authors of one version of the repeal legislation, wrote the Treasury
to voice their disagreement with the Treasury's interpretation, noting that the repeal legislation was
intended to benefit the housing finance industry. 25 TAx NOTES 406 (Oct. 29, 1984) and 25 TAX
NOTES 1065 (Dec. 17, 1984).
104 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-5(d)T (T.D. 8046, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,522, reprinted in 1985-40 I.R.B.
9). Pass-through certificates will be considered to be described in I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(B) (the require-
ments for obligations issued in bearer form) if the pass-through certificate itself is described in the
section, without regard to whether the underlying obligation held by the fund or trust is described in
that section. Id.
The rules in Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-5(d)T apply for any section that refers to those regula-
tions for the definition of the term "registration-required obligation." Id
In order to deal with potential abuses of the mortgage pass-through certificate provisions, the
Commissioner may characterize a certificate in accordance with the substance of the transaction,
and may impose the issuer sanctions under I.R.C. §§ 163(f)(1) and 4701. Id Thus, for example, if
obligations in registered form are contributed to a trust and bearer certificates in the trust are issued
in a form that does not meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(B), the obligations will not be
considered to be issued in registered form, nor will they meet the requirements of I.RC.
§ 163(f)(2)(B). Accordingly, no interest deduction will be allowed and an excise tax will be imposed.
Id
105 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5(d), Q&A-20 (T.D. 8046, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,522, reprinted in
1985-40 I.R.B. 9) provides that interest paid to a holder of a pass-through certificate will qualify as
portfolio interest under I.R.C. §§ 871(h)(2) or 881(c)(2) if it is described in A-I or A-8 of
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derwriter reports that "hundreds of millions of dollars" of mortgage-pool
securities are currently scheduled to be issued under the new
regulations. 10
6
D. The "Registration-Required Obligation" Rule
Perhaps the most controversial issue surrounding the repeal legisla-
tion lies in the Treasury's current interpretation of what types of obliga-
tions qualify for the withholding tax exclusion. The Code clearly limits
the repeal legislation to "portfolio interest" and defines that term with
respect to obligations in both registered and non-registered form.107 In
the temporary treasury regulations, however, the Treasury Department
has taken the position that only obligations which are "registration-re-
quired" within the meaning of I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(A) will be eligible for
the repeal legislation.'08  This interpretation prevents interest on three
categories of obligations from qualifying as "portfolio interest." Those
categories are:
(1) obligations issued by a natural person;
(2) obligations of a type not offered to the public; and
(3) obligations with maturities of not more than one year.'0 9
Treasury's interpretation has far-reaching implications in several ar-
§ 35a.9999-5, without regard to whether any obligation held by the fund or trust to which the pass-
through certificate relates is described in A-1 or A-8. However, a certificate issued after July 18,
1984 will qualify under this provision only to the extent that the underlying obligations are issued
after that date. Id
106 Tax Report, Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 5 (statement of Lewis S. Ranieri of Salomon
Bros., Inc.).
107 I.R.C. §§ 871(h)(2)(A) and (3), 881(c)(2)(A) and (B). See supra text accompanying notes 61-
65.
108 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5(a), A-1 provides:
Interest is portfolio interest within the meaning of section 871(h)(2)(A) or section 881(c)(2)(A)
only if it is paid with respect to an obligation issued after July 18, 1984, that is in bearer form
and if the obligation would be a registration-required obligation within the meaning of section
163(0(2)(A) but for the fact that it is described in section 163(0(2)(B). Therefore, interest paid
on an obligation issued by a natural person, or an obligation with a maturity at issue of not
more than one year, or on an obligation not of a type offered to the public (within the meaning
of section 163(f(2)(A)(ii) and the regulations thereunder) is not portfolio interest.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5(b), A-8 imposes similar conditions on obligations issued in regis-
tered form.
109 These categories of obligations are excluded by the regulations' reference to obligations which
are registration-required within the meaning of I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(A). As defined in I.R.C.
§ 163(f)(2), a "registration-required obligation" includes any obligation other than an obligation
which (i) is issued by a natural person, (ii) is not of a type offered to the public, (iii) has a maturity
(at issue) of not more than one year, or (iv) is described in I.R.C. § 163(0(2)(B). I.R.C.
§ 163(0(2)(B) provides that an obligation is described therein if:
(i) there are arrangements designed to ensure sales only to non-U.S. persons;
(ii) interest is payable only outside of the United States and its possessions; and
(iii) there is a legend on the face of the obligation stating that U.S. persons who hold such
obligations will be subject to limitations under U.S. income tax laws.
957
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eas. The first and most devastating effect is that issuers (corporate or
otherwise) are now unable to issue Eurobond debt through private-place-
ments since such obligations are "of a type not offered to the public."'1 "
Second, Eurobond obligations of partnerships are probably ineligible
for the exclusion from withholding because such obligations are, under
an "aggregate" theory of taxation,"' merely attributed to the underlying
individuals. Thus, large partnerships which might otherwise have ob-
tained financing in the Eurobond market are now precluded from using
that option.
Third, the exclusion of obligations with maturities of less than one
year from the benefits of the repeal legislation effectively precludes the
use of shorter-term obligations and hampers the establishment by compa-
nies of certain financing mechanisms, such as revolving underwriting fa-
I.R.C. § 163(f), enacted as part of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 596 was one of several provisions in that Act designed
to limit sales of bearer instruments to U.S. persons. Congress had noted that increasing numbers of
taxpayers were failing to include the interest income on bearer instruments in their tax returns. Such
omission was not difficult since bearer instruments do not name the owner of the obligation. In an
attempt to limit the sales of bearer instruments in the United States, Congress provided that U.S.
issuers and holders of such obligations would be denied certain tax benefits which would otherwise
be available if the obligations had been issued in registered form. Thus, I.R.C. § 163(f), an "issuer
sanction," denies an interest deduction on "registration-required obligations" not issued in registered
form. For a discussion of other sanctions imposed by TEFRA, see supra note 89.
Congress realized, however, that it would be impractical to require registration of all obliga-
tions. Therefore, Congress excluded certain obligations, namely, those issued by individuals, those
of a type not offered to the public, and those with maturities of less than one year, from regulation
requirements. Congress also excluded obligations sold to foreign persons, so long as the obligations
met requirements to ensure sale only to non-U.S. persons. I.R.C. § 163(f) embodies these restric-
tions and excludes from its provisions those categories of obligations which Congress believed should
not be "registration-required."
110 This interpretation is ironic in view of the fact that Congress' expressed purpose in enacting
the repeal legislation was to assist smaller companies which did not have the resources to use inter-
national finance subsidiaries. See supra note 33; see also EXPLANATION OF THE 1984 AcT, supra
note 6, at 392 (finance subsidiaries provided "incomplete access to the Eurobond market"). These
companies might readily use the private placement method in order to save money and to better
place their obligations in a market where many investors might otherwise prefer to invest in obliga-
tions of a larger issuer rather than those of a smaller, less-known company. Letter from Oppen-
heimer, Wolff, Foster, Shepard & Donnelly to the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service 10
(May 24, 1985) (available through Tax Notes Microfiche Service, Doc. 85-4901) [hereinafter cited as
Oppenheimer Letter].
111 The aggregate concept of partnership taxation is well reflected in I.R.C. § 701, which provides
"a partnership as such shall not be subject to the income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons
carrying on business as partners shall be liable for income tax only in their separate or individual
capacities." Moreover, partners are generally held individually liable for partnership debts and those
debts may be satisfied even out of personal assets. Finally, if the temporary regulations are correct in
excluding debts of natural persons from the definition of "portfolio interest," they should address
whether interest paid on obligations issued by partnerships and other noncorporate groups qualifies
for repeal legislation. Letter from ABA Tax Section members to Treasury, 25 TAX NOTES 1199
(Dec. 24, 1984).
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cilities (RUFs).112 The exclusion of such obligations seems particularly
unfair since, under a separate Code section, obligations with maturities of
less than six months are exempt from withholding.113 Thus, only obliga-
tions with maturities of six months to one year are subject to
withholding.
Several arguments can be advanced against Treasury's interpreta-
tion that "portfolio interest" be limited to interest on "registration-re-
quired obligations." The most potent attack on the regulations' validity
lies in the statutory language itself: the relevant Code section refers only
to the requirements of I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(B) (the foreign-targeted excep-
tion) in defining portfolio interest; it does not refer to I.R.C.
§ 163(f)(2)(A). t i4 Moreover, the section refers to I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(B)
only in defining "portfolio interest" on bearer obligations, yet the Service
has extended its restriction to both bearer and registered obligations.
There are other arguments against the Service's position on "regis-
tration-required" obligations. The distinction created by the Service ig-
nores the rationale behind Congress' original enactment of I.R.C.
§ 163(f)(2)-that of ensuring that interest deductions would be allowed
only where the interest income would be reported or collected at source,
or where the risk of not reporting such income was small." 5 The Ser-
1 12 A revolving underwriting facility (RUF) is a funding mechanism used by companies which
consists of the issuance of short-term Euronotes or Euro-Commercial Paper, backed in part by a
syndicated revolving credit. Dungan, The Structure of Revolving Underwriting Facilities, in EuRo-
NOTES-RUES, TRU~s, NIFs, SNIEFs AND BONUSES 9 (1985). The notes issued under these facili-
ties must currently be structured with a maturity of no more than 183 days from issuance, so that
withholding is not imposed thereon. I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1)(A) and (C), 871(g)(1)(B), 881(a)(1) and (3).
Were the maturity to extend beyond that date, withholding would be required on the original issue
discount under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35a.9999-5(a), Q&A-6. RU~s are becoming increasingly popu-
lar as credit facilities. In the first six months of 1985, $18.7 billion in credit was arranged in this
form. Financial Times, Jul. 8, 1985, at 17, col. 2. In May 1985, Sears Roebuck and Co. and Sears
Roebuck Acceptance Corp. signed an agreement arranging for a $500 million RUF. Gurnee, Sears
Roebuck and Co: A Corporate Issuer, in EURONOTs-RUFs, TRUs, NIFs, SNI~s AND BONUSES
93 (1985).
113 I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1)(A) and (C), 871(g), 881(a)(1) and (3).
114 I.R.C. §§ 871(h)(2) and 881(c)(2). Commentators have criticized the Treasury's interpreta-
tion of the statute on this basis. Letters of Willard B. Taylor of Sullivan & Cromwell in New York
and Dickson G. Brown of Simpson, Thatcher & Bartlett in New York to the Treasury, 25 TAX
NoTEs 611 (Nov. 12, 1984); Letter from ABA Tax Section members to Treasury, 25 TAx NoTEs
1199 (Dec. 24, 1984); Oppenheimer Letter, supra note 110, at 5. Had Congress intended that eligible
obligations be registration-required, it would have made the requirement explicit. Id. at 7.
115 In enacting I.R.C. § 163(f), Congress distinguished between registration-required and non-
registration required obligations in order "to add additional safeguards to those obligations whose
sheer numbers present a greater potential for tax avoidance." Oppenheimer Letter, supra note 110,
at 4. Congress exempted obligations which were short-term, not publicly-offered, or issued by a
natural person from the denial of interest deduction not only because it believed registration of such
obligations would be onerous, but also because such obligations are relatively few in number. Id. at
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vice's interpretation is also inconsistent with the legislative intent behind
the repeal legislation. The enacted legislation was chosen by Congress
over other proposals which would have limited the repeal to Eurobond-
type offerings (which are publicly offered). 116  Congress, however,
adopted a broader form of repeal, extending to interest paid on "any"
obligation meeting certain requirements. 1 7 This latter position is sup-
ported by Representative Sam Gibbons, a co-author of the repeal legisla-
tion, who insists that the repeal legislation was intended to apply to
privately-placed obligations.118
The Service's restrictive interpretation also appears unwarranted in
light of the safeguards that Congress built into the legislation to ensure
that interest income received by United States payees would be re-
ported.119 Bearer obligations are subject to controls on distribution and
payment of interest. Registered obligations disclose the payee's identity.
In either case, foreign payee status is virtually assured. Thus the regis-
tration-required standard "does not further a Congressional policy of
minimizing the risk of tax avoidance but merely capriciously denies the
repeal of the withholding tax on interest to certain types of
obligations." 120
Finally, the Service's restrictive interpretation discriminates in favor
of larger corporations by denying the benefits of private placements to
smaller corporations that often cannot afford the expense of a public
offering type of registration.12'
3. Thus, the distinction between registration-required obligations was not made in order to deny an
interest deduction on obligations exempt from registration requirements.
116 H.R. 4029 (introduced by Rep. Barnard) contained this limitation. See supra text accompany-
ing note 49.
117 I.R.C. § 871(h)(2)(A).
118 At a hearing on H.R. 1800, a Technical Corrections Bill, held on May 16, 1985 before the
House Ways and Means Committee, Treasury argued that the repeal should be interpreted as apply-
ing only to public offerings. Rep. Gibbons retorted, "[T]hat's not the way the law is written."
When Treasury admitted that including both types of obligations was "a fair interpretation," Gib-
bons snapped "[Imt's not only fair, that was my intent, and I'm the author." WEEKLY TAX REP.
(BNA), May 20, 1985, at 641. Sen. John Chafee, who co-authored the Senate companion bill to
Gibbons' H.R. 3025, however, supports Treasury's position. At a June 5, 1985 Senate Finance
Committee hearing on S. 814, a Technical Corrections Bill, Chafee observed, "It seemed clear to me
on 30-percent withholding we were dealing only with public issues." 109, DAILY REp. FOR Exacu-
TvEs (BNA) G-3 (Jun. 6, 1985).
119 In order to obtain the exemption for "portfolio interest," bearer debt must meet the three
restrictions contained in I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(B), while registered debt must be accompanied by a state-
ment indicating that the owner is not a U.S. person. I.R.C. §§ 871(h)(2) and 881(c)(2). Any obliga-
tions issued in the non-registration required category would still have to meet these criteria to qualify
for exemption from withholding.
120 Oppenheimer Letter, supra note 110, at 10.
121 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. It will be even more difficult for such companies
to obtain foreign financing in light of the Service's recent revenue rulings which invalidate the use of
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The restriction of repeal benefits to registration-required obligations
is an issue that is likely to be resolved soon. The Treasury Department
has proposed, as an addition to the Technical Corrections Bill of 1985, a
provision that would restrict "portfolio interest" to interest paid on obli-
gations issued pursuant to a public offering. 22 It is difficult to predict
whether Congress will reject or uphold Treasury's interpretation of the
repeal legislation. Although Treasury did concede its position on mort-
gage pass-through securities, 123 it is unlikely to do so with respect to the
general requirement that an obligation be registration-required to qualify
for the repeal legislation. Moreover, since the issuer most likely to be
finance subsidiaries on the conduit theory, Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 381 and Rev. Rul. 84-153,
1984-2 C.B. 383. These rulings have been criticized on various grounds, however, see infra notes
12547 and accompanying text. Moreover, Congress has expressed its intent to prohibit certain
back-to-back loans which could have been used by smaller companies in order to obtain financing.
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 60, at 937-38. See Oppenheimer Letter, supra note 110, at 10-14.
122 See Presentation of Roger Mentz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, at the Senate
Finance Committee hearing held June 5, 1985 (available through Tax Notes Microfiche Service,
Doc. 85-4808 at 16-17). Contending that such a proposal is "good tax policy," Mentz offered two
reasons for Treasury's view. First, he argued, the policy basis for unilateral repeal does not apply to
excluded obligations, Le., "trade indebtedness and obligations issued in private placements." Since
publicly-offered issues trade in active secondary markets, he noted, unilateral repeal was warranted
because there was no way that an issuer could ensure that an obligation would be held only by
residents of a treaty country. Privately-placed obligations or trade debt can be targeted to residents
of a treaty country, however, thereby incurring a lower or zero withholding tax rate. The second
reason offered by Mentz for Treasury's limitation on the repeal legislation was that other countries
generally have not repealed their withholding taxes on such obligations. Thus, argued Mentz, any
exemption should be negotiated through tax treaties, so that reciprocal treatment can be obtained for
U.S. taxpayers. In other words, Treasury wants to use the tax as a "bargaining chip" in its treaty
negotiations.
Treasury's two-part rationale for limiting the repeal legislation appears flawed, however, upon
closer examination. First, while non-publicly offered issues might be initially placed with residents
of a treaty country, resales of such obligations would be extremely difficult, perhaps to the point of
discouraging an investor from his initial purchase. The obligation would have to be resold to an-
other resident of a treaty country. Moreover, to ensure that the purchaser was such a person, the
obligations would have to be registered in some way. Foreign investors are reluctant, however, to
purchase obligations which are not in bearer form. Thus, the number of willing and able purchasers
would be few, causing a probable discount in the resale price. Private placement through treaty
exemption is not, therefore, as appealing as Treasury would make it sound. These drawbacks, there-
fore, place further restrictions on the smaller company attempting to raise capital abroad.
Treasury's second rationale for limiting the repeal legislation-for use as a "bargaining chip"--
is equally flawed. First, there are other types of interest which are still subject to treaty negotiation
(eg., interest on ordinary bank loans and related party debt). Mbreover, Treasury's ability to negoti-
ate zero rates of withholding have been successful in only about a third of the cases. Finally, since
repeal of U.S. withholding taxes serves to attract more investment into this country, it is questiona-
ble whether such an offer would be much of a bargaining chip with countries that wish to keep their
residents' capital within their own borders. Letter from Joseph Guttentag, of Arnold & Porter, to
Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary Roger Mentz (Jun. 12, 1985) in 27 TAx NOTES 1463 (Jun. 24,
1985).
123 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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interested in eliminating that requirement is the smaller corporation, 1"4 it
is questionable whether a strong constituency can be rallied to persuade
Congress to reject the Service's interpretation.
E. Treasury Opens the Window on Eurobond Issues
and Freezes the Antilles
On October 15, 1984, the Service issued two revenue rulings which
seriously impacted the status of financing transactions effected through
Netherlands Antilles companies. Rev. Rul. 84-152 (and related G.C.M.
37940) involved a back-to-back loan within a related group of corpora-
tions,12 5 while Rev. Rul. 84-153 involved a Eurobond offering made by a
Netherlands Antilles subsidiary of a United States parent.' 2 6 In both
cases, however, the Service found that the Antillean subsidiary was a
124 See supra notes 110 and 121 and accompanying text.
125 Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 381. In Rev. Rul. 84-152, a Swiss parent company (P) had a
wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary (R) and a wholly-owned Antillean subsidiary (S). In order to meet
R's need for working capital, on August 1, 1984 P lent the required funds to S at 10% and S
reloaned the proceeds of this loan to R at 1l%. While "neither R nor S was thinly capitalized," S
was not sufficiently liquid to make the loan to R in the absence of funds supplied by P. The net
interest income was retained by S, and the Ruling provides that the transactions "may (have)
serve(d) some business or economic purpose." The companies attempted to claim the benefit of the
U.S.-N.A. treaty for interest paid by R to S.
The Ruling, under the rationale discussed infra note 130, concludes that S is a mere "conduit"
and that the primary (but not sole) purpose of involving S was to obtain the benefits of the U.S.-N.A.
treaty and avoid the payment of U.S. taxes. Accordingly, the Service restructured the transaction as
if the obligation had been issued by P. Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984 C.B. at 382.
G.C.M. 37940 (Apr. 24, 1979, declassified Jan. 30, 1985) contains a proposed ruling which is
similar to Rev. Rul. 84-152, but which also contains several significant differences. In the G.C.M.,
the Swiss parent (P) could not supply its own capital, but could guarantee a loan since it had an
excellent credit rating and considerable unencumbered assets for security. P negotiated a loan ar-
rangement with a Swiss bank (without participation by S or R) to lend funds to S at 10% and P
guaranteed repayment of the loan in the event of default. S reloaned the funds to R at 11%.
While reaching the same conclusion as Rev. Rul. 84-152 (Le., that S is a mere "conduit" and
that the U.S.-N.A. treaty is inapplicable), the G.C.M. does appear to have more faithfully applied
the precedents cited therein. Since the G.C.M. states that the sole reason for the transaction was the
avoidance of U.S. taxes and since the arrangement involved a guarantee by P, the G.C.M.'s citations
to Aiken Indus. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 925 (1971) and to Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 462 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1972), 72-2 USTC 9494 seem to better support the "conduit" theory
than does Rev. Rul. 84-152. See infra note 127.
126 Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. 383. In Rev. Rul. 84-153, a U.S.-owned Antillean subsidiary
(S) lent the proceeds of two public Eurobond offerings to its U.S. affiliate (R) at 1% over the interest
rate on the Eurobonds. These offerings were made on July 1 and September 1, 1984. Neither S nor
R was thinly capitalized, S retained the net revenues, and the loan was said to serve "some business
or economic purpose." While the Ruling does not state that the U.S. parent guaranteed the repay-
ment of the bonds, such an arrangement is typical in most Netherlands Antilles Eurobond financ-
ings.
Utilizing the same conduit/primary purpose rationale as that used in Rev. Rul. 84-152, the
Ruling concludes that the U.S.-N.A. treaty exemption is not available. Moreover, notes the Ruling,
the I.R.C. §§ 871(h) and 881(c) exemptions for "portfolio interest" do not apply. See infra note 130.
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mere "conduit 127 and that the use of the subsidiary lacked "sufficient
business purpose" to overcome the conduit nature of the transaction.
Accordingly, the Service denied the U.S.-N.A. treaty exemption for
United States source interest paid to the subsidiary and imposed with-
holding tax on such payment.' The rulings were apparently issued to
enunciate new tests to be applied in the determination of whether certain
financing corporations or transactions would be disregarded for tax pur-
poses. The rulings, however, "provide little guidance as to the applica-
tion, scope or meaning of these tests."' 12 9 Moreover, the rulings appear to
be inconsistent with prior case law and with authority cited in the rulings
themselves. 130 The Service has made no attempt to reconcile these au-
127 The finding that S was a conduit was based on the fact that S did not obtain "complete
dominion and control" over the interest payments it received. Such dominion and control is re-
quired, according to the rulings, in order for the interest to be "derived by" S pursuant to the U.S.-
N.A. treaty. That treaty provides that:
(i)nterest... derived from sources within the United States by a resident or corporation of the
Netherlands not engaged in trade or business in the United States through a permanent estab-
lishment shall be exempt from United States tax... (emphasis supplied).
Art. VIII, U.S.-N.A. Treaty, supra note 23. In support of the requirement for complete dominion
and control, both rulings cite Aiken Indus. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 925 (1971), acq. 1972-2 C.B. 1.
Furthermore, note the rulings, while the transaction (and S's involvement therein) "may serve
some business or economic purpose," the use of S "lacks sufficient business or economic purpose to
overcome the conduit nature of the transaction." Rev. Rul. 84-152 at 382; Rev. Rul. 84-153 at 384
(emphasis supplied). Thus, the interest payments were not considered to be "derived by" S and the
U.S.-N.A. treaty exemption was unavailable. Id. For a criticism of the rationales applied in the
rulings, see infra note 130.
128 Rev. Rul. 84-152 at 382; Rev. Rul. 84-153 at 384.
129 LeDuc & Robinson, The New Assault on Related Party Financing: How Far Will the Service
Go?, 11 INT'L TAx J. 167, 168 (1985).
130 Both rulings and the G.C.M. cite Aiken Industries, 56 T.C. 925 in holding that the interest
was not "derived by" the Antillean subsidiary because the subsidiary did not obtain complete domin-
ion and control over the payment. However, Aiken is distinguishable from the rulings and the
G.C.M. in that, in Aiken, the Bahamanian corporation disregarded by the Service was committed to
pay out exactly what it got, making no profit on the transaction. In the rulings and G.C.M. how-
ever, the Antillean subsidiary made a profit on the transaction from the interest rate differential.
The rulings also cite Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (sham doctrine) and Aiken as
authority for the holding that the use of the Antillean subsidiary lacked sufficient business or eco-
nomic purpose to overcome the conduit nature of the transaction. However, in both Aiken and
Gregory, the courts found that the transactions had no business or economic purpose. The rulings,
by contrast, indicate that there was some business purpose involved. As one commentator notes,
"[Tihe emphasis upon the strength or importance-as opposed to the mere existence-of a business
purpose may represent one of the most important departures of the two rulings from prior law."
LeDuc & Robinson, supra note 129, at 185. See Sam Siegel, 45 T.C. 566 (1966), acq. 1966-2 C.B. 7
and Perry R. Bass, 50 T.C. 595 (1968), wherein the court refused to disregard the existence of corpo-
rations formed in Panama and Switzerland, respectively, even though the incorporations were found
to be for tax avoidance purposes.
Finally, the G.C.M. cites Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 712 (5th Cir.
1972), 72-2 USTC 9494 as support for reattributing the loan to the parent as a result of the parent's
guarantee of the loan. However, in Plantation Patterns, the loan was reattributed to a shareholder-
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thorities or to clarify its tests. Consequently, the rulings have also cre-
ated a great deal of uncertainty in the area."' Finally, in unilaterally
overruling the U.S.-N.A. treaty, the rulings are bad policy and a poten-
tial violation of international law. 132
guarantor because the nominal debtor corporation had a debt-to-equity ratio of 214:1. In the
G.C.M., however, the Antillean subsidiary is said not to be thinly capitalized.
Several commentators have criticized the rulings, both for their incorrect application of prece-
dent and for their effect on treaty obligations and international relations. On the latter issue, see
infra note 132. Criticisms include Cole & Musher, Rev. Ruls 84-152, 84-153 and G.CM. 37940
Depart from U.S. Treaty Obligations, 14 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. (BNA) 265 (1985); Feingold & Fish-
man, supra note 5, at 172; Fogarasi & Renfroe, Is the Benefit of the US.-Netherlands Antilles Treaty
Terminated for Financing Companies?, 13 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. (BNA) 442 (1984); Fuller, G.GM.
37940: Rev. RuL 84-152 and the Conduit Use of Treaties, 64 TAXES INT'L 76 (Feb. 1985); LeDuc &
Robinson, supra note 129; Segal & Davis, supra note 5, at 133-34. See also Letter from United States
Council for International Business to the Treasury (Jan. 18, 1985) (available through Tax Notes
Microfiche Service, Doc. 85-850); Letters from Congress objecting to the rulings, infra note 140.
131 It is unclear, for example, whether the "dominion and control" test and the "sufficient busi-
ness or economic purpose" test, if valid, should be applied alternatively or in conjunction. LeDuc &
Robinson, supra note 129, at 185-86, 191. Additional uncertainties are raised by Fogarasi & Ren-
froe, supra note 131, at 445-46.
While the retroactive application of the rulings was initially an area of uncertainty, the issuance
under I.R.C. § 7805(b) of seven private letter rulings and Rev. Rul. 85-163 has substantially allayed
those concerns. See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
132 In their attempt to combat treaty shopping, the rulings also fail to address the 1963 Protocol
to the U.S.-N.A. treaty. That Protocol was specifically concerned with third country access to the
Treaty. S. RaP. No. 10, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1965-1 C.B. 633, 665. The re-
sponse of the Protocol to this issue was that Antillean companies would be entitled to treaty benefits
if such companies were subject to full Antillean tax rates (and not entitled to special tax benefits,
including a 3% tax rate). Id. at 669. Contemporaneously with the ratification of the Protocol, the
Service issued Rev. Rul. 65-16, 1965-1 C.B. 626, which held that Antillean companies electing to be
taxed under Art. 8A of the Antilles Profit Tax Ordinance (at approximately 30% on net profits)
would not be considered to be entitled to special tax benefits. Most Antillean finance subsidiaries
have made this election and thus, should be entitled to the Treaty exemption on U.S. withholding
tax.
Moreover, the Protocol addressed the so-called "secondary tax" exemption in Article XII.
That exemption allowed Antillean companies to pay interest to third country residents free of U.S.
withholding tax. In rejecting any limitation on this exemption, the Treasury stated:
In recommending ratification of Article I of the Protocol, the Treasury continues to recognize
the desirability of encouraging foreign portfolio investment in the United States during our
present imbalance of international payments. To this end, care has been taken not to remove
from the treaty those provisions (such as the exemption of Netherlands Antilles corporations
from the so-called 'secondary tax' on dividends and interest paid by them to persons other than
U.S. persons) which have long been an intended benefit of the U.S. treaty program.
Id at 669. Since the 1963 Protocol established specific conditions for the exemption from U.S.
withholding tax on U.S. source interest, and rejected a limitation on the exemption from "secondary
tax," it appears that the Treasury was attempting to unilaterally rewrite the Protocol in its issuance
of the rulings. Cole & Musher, supra note 130, at 271.
From a policy standpoint, the rulings are also subject to criticism. The issuance of the rulings
departs from a long-standing tradition of renegotiation with competent authority of the treaty coun-
try to solve problems of treaty shopping. Fogarasi & Renfroe, supra note 130, at 446. Moreover, the
rulings could lead to discriminatory treatment of the Antilles and other treaty partners whose treaty
contains the same "derived by" language (as opposed to simply "paid to"). Id. Finally, since the
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While Rev. Rul. 84-152 is potentially broader than Rev. Rul. 84-
153,113 the latter ruling had a greater impact on traditional Eurobond
offerings done through Antillean subsidiaries. Significantly, in Rev. Rul.
84-153, the Service found that interest, paid on obligations issued on July
1, 1984 through an Antillean subsidiary, was subject to the thirty percent
withholding tax.134 First, the Ruling held that the treaty exemption was
unavailable because interest had not been "derived... by" the subsidi-
ary, as the treaty language requires. Instead, the Service considered the
Antillean subsidiary to be a mere "conduit" for the passage of interest
payments to foreign bondholders. 135 Second, the ruling held that the ex-
emption of withholding on "portfolio interest" was not available because
the bonds were issued on July 1, 1984, prior to the effective date of the
repeal legislation (July 18, 1984), but subsequent to the date provided in
the 1984 Act for the grandfathering of such Antillean financing arrange-
ments (June 22, 1984).136
In denying the benefits of the repeal legislation to the interest pay-
ment made on the July 1, 1984 obligation, the Service had, in effect, given
notice to companies who had floated Eurobond issues during the "win-
dow period" (June 22-July 18, 1984) that such issuances would not qual-
ify for the legislation. 137  These companies were thus faced with the
rulings can be said to unilaterally override the U.S.-N.A. Treaty (and possibly others), there is a
possible violation of international law involved. Id at 444.
133 Although Rev. Rul. 84-153 had more immediate impact on companies who had issued
Eurobonds through an Antillean finance subsidiary, Rev. RuL. 84-152 appears to have had a broader
impact on treaty shopping arrangements through treaties similar to the U.S.-N.A. Treaty. More-
over, Rev. Rul. 84-152 "could be interpreted as being retroactive forever." 201 DAILY REP. FOR
EXECurvFs (BNA) G-4 (Oct. 17, 1984) (statement of John Venuti). "The implications for other
treaties and other types of income is the key question." Id (statement of H. David Rosenbloom,
former Treasury Department International Tax Counsel).
134 See supra note 126 for a summary of the facts and conclusions of Rev. Rul. 84-153.
135 Id. See supra note 130.
136 Section 127(g) of the 1984 Act provided that the repeal legislation applied only to obligations
issued after the effective date.
See supra note 76 for a discussion of the grandfathering rule contained in the 1984 Act.
In Rev. RUl. 84-153, there was also a September 1, 1984 issuance of bearer debt. Those obliga-
tions were found to be ineligible for the grandfathering provision since they were issued after June
22, 1984. Moreover, the obligations were also found to be ineligible for the repeal legislation, be-
cause they "did not meet the requirements of Section 163(f)(2)(B) of the Code and the regulations
thereunder." Rev. Rul. 84-153 at 383.
137 There were at least nine corporations that had issued Eurobonds through Antillean finance
subsidiaries between June 22 and July 18, 1984, including First Federal of Michigan-200 million;
G.M.A.C.-$200 million; G.E.C.C.-$600 million; and Sears Roebuck & Co.-$500 million. 202
DAILY REP. FOR ExEcu'vnS (BNA) G-7, -8 (Oct. 18, 1984).
While not explicitly stated, Rev. Rul. 84-153 actually resulted in the creation of two window
periods. (1) obligations issued between June 22 and July 18, 1984. Although these obligations
would not qualify for the "portfolio interest" exemption nor for treaty benefits (under the facts'of the
Ruling), relief requests under I.R.C. § 7805(b) were available. See infra note 142. (2) Obligations
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prospect of redeeming and refinancing debt of almost $2 billion13 or pay-
ing the withholding tax and increasing their debt costs by forty-three
percent,1 39 both of which were unattractive alternatives.
The Service's response to the ensuing market outrage"4 was as
poorly calculated as its initial issuance of the Rulings had been. While
unofficial responses seemed to downplay the gravity of the Rulings,1 4'
the official response of the Service was that corporations affected by the
Rulings should apply for relief through a ruling request. 42 Such re-
quests, fied under I.R.C. § 7805(b), would be based on the fact that the
issue was in process prior to June 22, 1984, and would receive expedited
issued between July 18 and August 22, 1984 (the date of the issuance of the temporary regulations
under the repeal legislation). These obligations will not be affected if they meet the requirements of
I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(B) as subsequently interpreted by the regulations. However, if they do not meet
those requirements, withholding will apply. Fogarasi & Renfroe, supra note 130, at 444. While
relief under I.R.C. § 7805 was not originally available for issuances during the second period, Rev.
Rul. 85-163 will prevent the retroactive application of the Ruling to such issuances. See infra notes
145-46.
138 Although interest rates had generally fallen from June-July 1984 until October 1984 (when
the rulings were issued), refinancing would have been undesirable because of the stigma it would
attach to an issuer's reputation in the market.
139 See supra note 19.
140 In addition to the criticisms raised by affected companies and commentators, certain members
of Congress wrote to the Treasury expressing their objections to the application of the rulings to
Antillean Eurobond issues. Letters of Reps. Ronnie Flippo, Frank Guarini, Richard Schulze and
William Thomas to the Treasury, 27 TAX NoTEs 1332 (Jun. 17, 1985) and 27 TAX NoTEs 1438
(Jun. 24, 1985). In response to these letters, Ronald Pearlman, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy,
took the approach that the result of the rulings was mandated by Congress' action in grandfathering
obligations issued before June 22, 1984. Prior to the repeal legislation, Pearlman noted, the finance
subsidiaries had been subject to various attacks on audit. In enacting the repeal legislation and
grandfathering certain issues, Congress removed all policy reasons for the use of such finance subsid-
iaries. "Indeed," said Pearlman, "the legislative history of the 1984 Act indicates that we are re-
quired not to respect such companies." Letter of Ronald Pearlman to Congressmen, reprinted in 28
TAX NOTES 1105 (Sept. 2, 1985).
Pearlman's analysis is questionable. First, the Conference Committee Report on the 1984 Act
clearly provides, "[No inference should be drawn from (the grandfathering rule) regarding the
proper resolution of other tax issues." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 60, at 938. Second, there
are clearly some remaining instances where finance subsidiaries may have to be resorted to in order
to issue Eurobonds free of the 30% withholding tax. Most notably, private placements are not
eligible for the repeal legislation, see supra note 110. Also, certain CFCs, banks and 10%-or-more
owners are similarly ineligible for the exemption, see supra notes 66-69. See also LeDuc & Robinson,
supra note 129, at 191-96 for other cases in which the finance subsidiary structure might still be used.
141 Unnamed Treasury officials are reported to have said, the window "is only an incidental con-
sequence of this ruling. The real issue is, if you go through an Antillean finance subsidiary, a certain
level of capitalization will be required for the subsidiary to be considered financially independent."
203 DAILY REP. FOR ExEcuTnvs (BNA) G-3 (Oct. 19, 1984). This statement, however, belies the
basis for the rulings because in each case, the facts stated that the Antillean subsidiary was not thinly
capitalized. See supra notes 125-26.
142 I.R.S. News Release 110 (Oct 18, 1984), reprinted at 84-10 CCH 6879.
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treatment. 4 On February 19 and 20, 1985, favorable rulings were given
to seven issuers. 144 The same ruling was, in effect, given to all taxpayers
through the Service's recent issuance of Rev. Rul. 85-163.' a4 That rul-
ing, however, is hardly a "safe harbor," since it merely provides that the
holdings of Rev. Ruls. 84-152 and 84-153 will not be applied retroac-
tively to obligations issued on or before October 15, 1984, or in process
on or before that date. 1" Clearly, it is the Service's intention to continue
to attack obligations which fall into the window period. If based on the
"conduit" rationale espoused in Rev. Ruls. 84-152 and 84-153, those at-
tacks may also affect any taxpayer utilizing a treaty similar to the U.S.-
N.A. treaty for financing transactions. 47
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS
Since its introduction, the repeal legislation has engendered debate
in political and financial circles as to the likely effects of the legislation on
the United States capital market and on the economy as a whole.' 48 An
analysis of these arguments, however, supports the conclusion that the
long-term effects of the repeal legislation will be positive.
A. Capital Formation
While critics of the repeal legislation contend that the measure will
result in little capital formation, 49 it is more widely believed that the
repeal of the withholding tax will be successful in attracting new capital
to this country, thereby enabling businesses to become more efficient, to
lower the cost of their goods, and to compete with imported products.'5 0
Moreover, as the supply of new capital (estimated in one study to be $5-7
billion)' increases, United States interest rates should decrease" 2 and
143 Id
144 L.T.RLs 8520055, 8520061, 8520062, 8520092 (supplemented by 8528031), 8520093, 8520094
and 8520095 (Feb. 19-20, 1985). The letter rulings each conclude: "Pursuant to the authority con-
tained in section 7805(b), the holding of Rev. Rul. 84-153 wil not be retroactively applied to the
obligations issued on (date) by (company)."
145 Rev. Rul. 85-163, 1985-41 .LRB. 25.
146 Id. October 15, 1984 represents the date that the revenue rulings were issued.
147 See supra note 132.
148 For a summary of the policy arguments made by proponents and opponents of the repeal
legislation see JoiNT COMMrrrTE PRINT OF 1984, supra note 20, at 20-29.
149 See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
150 See eg., Minor Tax Bills, supra note 14, at 91, 94 (report of the Securities Industry
Association).
151 Id.
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come into equilibrium with Eurobond market interest rates. 53  Thus,
these two markets should become more integrated and efficient, 154 broad-
ening and facilitating trading in the secondary securities market and
making the obligations more marketable.
The benefit of the repeal legislation should not be diluted, as oppo-
nents155 had argued, by the fact that many exceptions to withholding
already existed prior to the passage of the legislation.'56 These excep-
tions, such as the use of treaties, statutory exemptions, and the foreign
tax credit, were not nearly as comprehensive as the repeal legislation.
There were, for example, tax-exempt foreign investors who could not
utilize the foreign tax credit and investors from countries with which the
United States had no treaty.' 5 7 These investors will now be able to invest
in United States obligations without the imposition of a withholding tax
at source. This analysis also refutes the argument of opponents that the
benefits of repeal would accrue only to "tax evaders" since, prior to the
repeal, all other investors were exempt by treaty or through the use of
credits. 158
B. Employment and Balance of Trade
The repeal legislation should help to increase employment in the
United States as companies transform new capital funds into the produc-
tion of goods.' 59 Moreover, the legislation may be successful in bringing
153 Id. at 37, 41.
154 Id. at 33-34 (statement of Ronald Pearlman of the Treasury Dept.).
155 Along with several Congressmen, notably Reps. Stark, Dorgan and Metzenbaum, the most
outspoken opponents to the repeal legislation were the AFL-CIO and a consumer group, Citizens for
Tax Justice. In their statement, included as an exhibit to the May 1, 1984 hearings, the AFL-CIO
cited the problems they associated with the repeal legislation: speculative money, which creates
instability and uncertainty, tax preferences for foreigners, and the image of the United States as a tax
haven country. May 1, 1984 Hearings, supra note 3, at 312-13. The Citizens for Tax Justice also
testified at the hearings in opposition to the repeal legislation. Robert S. McIntyre, the group's
Director, addressed the following concerns: the rise in the strength of the dollar, worsening trade
deficits, the increasing cost of U.S. exports and the resultant loss of jobs in those sectors, and the
transformation of the United States into a tax haven country. Id at 238-39 (statement of Robert S.
McIntyre).
Of course, the Netherlands Antilles also opposed the repeal legislation. See infra note 198 and
accompanying text.
156 See supra note 20 for a list of these exceptions; see also May 1, 1984 Hearings, supra note 3, at
242 (statement of Robert S. McIntyre); 1976 Hearings on Foreign Investment, supra note 39, at 35
(statement of Hugh Ault, Professor at Boston College).
157 See supra note 21.
158 See supra note 156.
159 "The price of less capital formation is higher unemployment." 1976 Hearings on Foreign
Investment, supra note 39, at 21 (statement of Robert Roosa, Chairman of NYSE Advisory
Committee).
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back to the United States some of the financing activity which shifted to
London in the 1970s and 1980s, and, in so doing, should recapture the
related employment and tax receipts from this sector of the economy."16
Using a capital/employment ratio of $24,000/1, one estimate suggests
that the repeal legislation could produc as many as 250,000 new jobs.161
It is also likely, however, that the increase in foreign investment in
United States assets will strengthen the dollar somewhat, resulting in an
increase in the United States trade balance deficit and higher unemploy-
ment in export-related industries. 62 The repeal legislation is not, how-
ever, solely responsible for this result; the strength of the dollar is also
directly attributable to federal deficit levels,163 to the weakness of other
countries' economies, and to the attractiveness of United States assets as
a whole. Moreover, to the extent that the repeal legislation results in a
decrease in domestic interest rates, this may also help to reduce the ex-
change rate.'64 Finally, the increase in the strength of the dollar should
not be large, because most of the new capital will come from a shift from
other dollar-denominated investments to dollar-denominated
Eurobonds.' 65
C. Efficiency of Financing
The use of foreign finance subsidiaries as an indirect means of acces-
sing the Eurobond market was an inefficient system which increased the
cost of raising capital. 166 Moreover, small business could rarely afford
the legal and financial expertise necessary to take advantage of the Antil-
lean finance subsidiary system.1 67 The repeal legislation will simplify the
method by which companies access the Eurobond market and may allow
small businesses to compete in that market. Securities experts are uncer-
tain as to whether or not foreign investors will be receptive to issues of
small, unknown companies.' 68 Even if these companies are not success-
160 Hearings on S. 1557, supra note 30, at 244 (statement of John Evans of Morgan Stanley &
Co.).
161 Minor Tax Bills, supra note 14, at 137 (statement of John Hennessy of First Boston Corp.).
162 May 1, 1984 Hearings, supra note 3, at 238 (statement of Robert S. McIntyre).
163 Id
164 Id at 51 (statement of Rep. Barber Conable).
165 "Any shift into dollar investments is likely to be small in relation to the annual foreign de-
mand for dollars... which now totals more than $400 billion." Id at 33 (statement of Ronald
Pearlman of the Treasury Dept.).
166 Minor Tax Bills, supra note 14, at 132 (statement of John Hennessy of First Boston Corp.).
167 Hearings on S. 1557, supra note 30, at 244 (statement of Nicholas Rey of Merrill Lynch).
168 Compare the remarks of John Evans of Morgan Stanley (sophisticated foreign investors would
participate in higher yield domestic issues of smaller and lesser-known companies) May 1. 1984
hearings, supra note 3, at 254, with those of Robert Loverd of First Boston (overseas investors are
extremely conservative and will not be interested in issues of small, lower credit corporations), id at
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ful in issuing bonds in the foreign market, however, they should receive
some benefit from the expected reduction in United States interest
rates.169 Unfortunately, the real benefits to small companies may be fore-
stalled or eliminated by the Treasury's interpretation that private place-
ments will not qualify for the repeal legislation. 70
D. Control of Money Supply and Reliance on Foreign Debt
Eurobond money is a long-term (five-to-ten year) stable source of
funds.'7 1 Thus, it is unlikely to cause the surges in the money supply or
"flight capital" that opponents had argued would result if foreign inves-
tors were to move funds around seeking the highest rate of retur. 172
Moreover, to the extent that dollars are shifted away from shorter-term
investments, which have historically been subject to such surges, control
of the money supply should become more manageable. 173 Finally, under
the current system of flexible exchange rates, capital mobility is not a
disadvantage; rather, it increases the efficacy of domestic monetary
policy.
E. International and Domestic Tax Evasion
Some members of Congress are concerned that any increase in the
use of bearer bonds-the form commonly used in the Eurobond mar-
ket-will result in an increase in tax evasion by United States citizens
who may attempt to pose as foreigners by setting up foreign corporations
or trust arrangements.1 74 The safeguards included in the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA"), 171 however, should be ad-
equate to deal with such attempts at tax evasion176 Congress designed
these provisions to discourage the issuance and holding of bearer obliga-
265. Query to what extent, however, the exclusion of private placements from the benefits of the
repeal legislation will restrict smaller companies' access to the Eurobond market. See supra note 110
and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 152.
170 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
171 Hearings on S. 1557, supra note 30, at 252-53 (statement ofFenton J. Burke, Esq.); Minor Tax
Bills, supra note 14, at 91-92 ("Withholding tax discourages stable and desirable long-term invest-
ment) (statement of Nicholas Rey of the Securities Industry Association").
172 Hearings on S. 1557, supra note 30, at 246 (statement of Robert S. McIntyre).
173 Id. at 253 (statement of Fenton J. Burke, Esq.).
174 See, eg., May 1, 1984 Hearings, supra note 3, at 43-45 (conversation between Rep. Dorgan
and Asst. Secretary Pearlman on tax evasion concerns).
175 The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324. See
supra notes 89 and 109.
176 May 1, 1984 Hearings, supra note 3, at 50 (statement of Ronald Pearlman of the Treasury
Dept.). In addition, see. 127(f) of the 1984 Act amends I.R.C. § 163(0(2) and gives the Secretary
broad discretion to require registration. See supra note 72.
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tions by United States persons. Most United States obligations must now
be registered in order to avoid the "issuer" and "holder sanctions" 17
7
enacted under TEFRA. Congress provided an exception to the issuer
sanctions, however, for companies issuing bearer obligations in the
Eurobond market. 178 This exception, included in I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(B), is
commonly known as the "foreign-targeted" exception to the registration
requirements. 179 The exception is available only where (1) the issuance is
designed to ensure that the obligations will be sold only to non-United
States persons; (2) the interest is payable only outside the United States
and its possessions and; (3) the face of the obligation bears a legend that
any United States holder will be subject to the holder sanctions.'80 The
Service has recently issued temporary regulations under the repeal legis-
lation.' 8 ' These regulations incorporate and modify the TEFRA regula-
tions, producing a formidable compliance system which will be difficult
for would-be tax evaders to overcome. 182
F. Equity Considerations
The correct comparison to be made when discussing considerations
of equity is that of the United States treatment of foreign investors versus
the treatment accorded to United States investors by other countries. 18 3
Many countries currently exempt Eurobond purchasers from outside
their borders from withholding taxes.' 84 To this extent, the repeal legis-
lation brings the United States into conformity with the tax practices of
177 The sanctions imposed on an issuer of registration-required obligations not in registered form
include a disallowance of the deduction for interest paid on the obligations and the imposition of an
excise tax of 1% of the principal amount of the obligations. I.R.C. §§ 163(0(1) and 4701.
The sanctions imposed upon a U.S. holder of a registration-required obligation not in registered
form include a disallowance for any loss sustained on a sale or other disposition of the obligation and
the requirement that any gain on the sale of the obligation be characterized as ordinary income.
I.R.C. §§ 165(j0) and 1287(a). See supra note 89.
178 I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(B).
179 Repeal of the Withholding Tax, supra note 5, at 46.
180 I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).
181 See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
182 Tax evasion will be especially difficult for holders of Treasury securities. Although Treasury
initially considered issuing its obligations in bearer form, pressures from Congress on the tax evasion
issue (including a nonbinding "sense of the Senate" resolution and bills prohibiting issuance of such
obligations in bearer form) forced then-Secretary Regan, on August 16, 1984, to announce that the
Treasury and its agencies would not issue bearer bonds. Later, on September 7, 1984, Regan an-
nounced that the issuance of any Government-backed security in bearer form would be prohibited.
See infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
183 JOINT COMMrEE PRINT OF 1984, supra note 20, at 22.
184 A list of those countries which do not impose withholding tax on Eurobond issues appears in
the Securities Industry Association report in the 1984 hearings on the repeal legislation. May 1,
1984 Hearings, supra note 3, at 75.
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those countries. Moreover, the legislation supports the longstanding
principle of international taxation that portfolio investors should be sub-
ject to taxation on interest income in their own country of residence or
nationality.18
5
It is not theoretically sound to compare the United States treatment
of foreign investors and the United States treatment of domestic taxpay-
ers. This comparison, drawn by opponents of the legislation, suggests
that it is inequitable to exempt foreigners from withholding taxes on in-
terest when United States taxpayers have to pay taxes on domestic inter-
est income at rates of up to fifty percent. 186 There are several arguments
to refute this charge. First, the United States taxpayer receiving domes-
tic interest income clearly derives benefits from residing in the United
States that the foreign investor does not.'8 7 Second, although the maxi-
mum tax rate that a United States taxpayer pays on domestic interest
income is as high as fifty percent, deductions against this income are al-
lowed so that the effective tax rate may be far below fifty percent. The
foreign investor, conversely, is not allowed any deductions against the
thirty percent withholding tax, so that his effective tax rate is often
higher than that of a United States taxpayer.188
Finally, opponents argue that foreigners are "privileged" to invest in
United States assets and, accordingly, should pay a tax for this privi-
lege.189 This argument is without merit. No one would suggest that an
individual should charge his or her bank a fee for the privilege of lending
to him or her.' The foreigner's investment in United States assets is no
more than a loan to a United States corporation or the federal
government.
185 Treaties which grant an exemption on interest income relinquish their "source" jurisdiction
and give taxing jurisdiction to the investor's country of residence. See Article XI of the U.S. Treas-
ury Dept. Model Income Tax Treaty (Jun. 16, 1981). See also 1976 Hearings on Foreign Investment,
supra note 39, at 5, 24, 36 (discussions by panelists on their views as to the appropriate method of
taxing foreigners on their interest income earned in other countries).
186 This argument was advanced as early as 1975 by members of Congress who opposed the
repeal legislation. See 122 CONG. REc. 23,877 (1976) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) and 121 CONG.
RIc. 38,287 (1975) (statement of Rep. Fisher).
187 The U.S. taxpayer receives services from the federal government and the protection of U.S.
laws. Thus, a cost/benefit analysis can be applied to this relationship. The application of such an
analysis in the case of interest income paid to a foreign investor is much more problematic. Accord-
ingly, treaties generally exempt such income from source withholding. D. TILLINGHAST, TAx As-
PEcis oF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 5-6 (2d ed. 1984).
188 CRS STUDy, supra note 16, at 8.
189 Senator Packwood advanced this argument in the early debates on the repeal legislation. 122
CONG. REc. 23,876 (1976).
190 122 CONG. REc. 23,877 (1976) (statement of Sen. Brock).
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G. Treaty Negotiations and Treaty Shopping
Some experts believe that treaty shoppers, tax evaders and suspected
drug criminals have historically used the U.S.-N.A. treaty to avoid taxa-
tion or detection by United States authorities. This, they feel, has been
made possible by the Antillean government's lack of strong law enforce-
ment, its reliance on the revenues that these activities generate, and its
status as a "tax haven."'191 For more than four years, the United States
has been trying to strengthen certain provisions of the treaty so as to
require greater surveillance by the Antillean government and informa-
tion exchange between the countries. Prior to the passage of the repeal
legislation, the United States was having difficulty renegotiating the U.S.-
N.A. treaty because the treaty contained exemptions allowing United
States companies to access the Eurobond market through the Antillean
finance subsidiary system.'92 The United States government was reluc-
tant to terminate or jeopardize this access. Now that United States com-
panies are no longer dependent upon the U.S.-N.A. treaty, however,
negotiators can work either to eliminate the treaty shopping and other
abuses that take place through the treaty, or, if negotiations are unsuc-
cessful, they can terminate the treaty.193 It is estimated that almost $1
billion in annual tax revenues goes uncollected as a result of abuses of
this tax haven treaty. 194 Thus, the repeal legislation may allow the
United States to indirectly recoup these losses by strengthening the
United States position in these treaty negotiations.
Opponents of the repeal legislation contend that the legislation rep-
resents a unilateral concession of a valuable "bargaining chip": the re-
duction in the thirty percent withholding tax on interest. They note that,
prior to the repeal legislation, countries negotiated such reductions on a
reciprocal basis. Thus, they contend that the United States has thrown
away this negotiating tool without receiving any quid pro quo.195 The
United States will not, however, be placed in a disadvantageous bargain-
ing position in all treaty negotiations by having unilaterally granted this
191 Hearings on Tax Evasion, supra note 34, at 570-71. While there is no standard definition of a
"tax haven," most definitions are similar to that of the Treasury Department: "any country having a
low or zero rate of tax on all or certain categories of income, and offering a certain level of banking
or commercial secrecy." TAx HAVENS, supra note 34, at 14.
192 The reluctance of the United States to terminate treaty negotiations with the Antillean gov-
ernment stemmed from the realization that the closing of the Eurobond window would have a detri-
mental effect on the U.S. financial markets. The presentation of the Securities Industry Association
in the 1984 hearings includes a discussion of those effects, most notably those of "crowding out" and
a rise in interest rates. May 1, 1984 Hearings, supra note 3, at 72-74.
193 Id at 92 (statement of John Gunner of the U.S. General Accounting Office).
194 129 CONG. REC. E4643 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983) (statement of Rep. Barnard).
195 122 CONG. REC. 23,874 (1976) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
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concession. First, it is questionable whether reciprocal elimination of the
withholding tax on interest income has ever been truly effective in gain-
ing concessions in treaty negotiations. 196 Second, there are many other
forms of income to which the withholding tax still applies and which can
be utilized as "bargaining chips" in the treaty negotiation process if so
desired. 197
H. Foreign Policy Aspects
The repeal legislation eliminates the need for United States compa-
nies to utilize the foreign finance subsidiary structure that previously
flourished in the Netherlands Antilles. Therefore, it is likely that the
legislation will cause some hardship to the Antillean economy, which
relies upon its financing sector for approximately twenty-five percent of
the country's gross national product.' 98 As evidence of concern for the
Antillean economy, however, Congress provided for direct Eurobond ac-
cess only on obligations issued after July 18, 1984.199 Issues in existence
on that date will continue to be serviced through the Antillean finance
subsidiary structure. This provision should allow the Antillean economy
some time to adjust to the effects of the legislation and to develop other
sources of revenue for the future.2co
The repeal legislation may also result in retaliatory action by foreign
governments who, in order to compete with the United States for funds,
may be forced either to enact similar legislation or to increase the interest
rates that they currently pay.201 To this extent, opponents argued, the
effect of the repeal legislation would be neutralized, and only the foreign
investor would gain. This has not, however, proven to be true. Although
some governments have, in fact, enacted similar legislation, their actions
have not reduced the capital flowing to the United States, largely because
196 Governments are not generally interested in having their citizens invest in other countries'
assets. Thus, in most cases, reciprocal elimination or reduction of the withholding tax is not eagerly
sought by those governments. Minor Tax Bills, supra note 14, at 134 (statement of John Henessy of
First Boston Corp.).
197 JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT OF 1984, supra note 20, at 23.
198 May 1, 1984 Hearings, supra note 3, at 119 (statement of Prime Minister Dominico Martina).
Economic data in the hearings also indicated that the subsidiary financing industry was one of the
four "pillars" of the Antillean economy. Repeal of the withholding legislation, the prime minister
said, would (1) cost the United States a half-billion dollars over the next 5 years; (2) destabilize the
Netherlands Antilles by reducing revenues and increasing unemployment (from 20 to 27%); and
(3) conflict with the goals of the Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative. Id. at 119-25.
199 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
200 EXPLANATION OF THE 1984 ACT, supra note 6, at 392-93.
201 May 1, 1984 Hearings, supra note 3, at 94 (statement of John Gunner of the U.S. General
Accounting Office).
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of the relative attractiveness of United States securities.
202
I Revenue Effects
The short and long-term effects of the repeal legislation on govern-
ment revenues were, and remain, difficult to estimate. Revenue estimates
on the repeal legislation varied widely, depending on the source of the
estimate and on the proposal being analyzed.20 3 It was generally ac-
knowledged, however, that the following would result:
(1) The direct effect of repeal would be the loss of whatever was being
202 Since the repeal legislation became effective, Great Britain, France and West Germany have
all taken steps to exempt foreign investors from any withholding tax on interest paid on government
securities. See infra note 213.
203 Treasury originally estimated a revenue gain of $35 to 50 million annually from repeal under
H.R. 3025. Revenue Increase Proposals, supra note 41, at 295. Problems in making such predictions
arose from the following assumptions which had to be made as to existing expenditures:
(1) That the U.S. corporations and their Antillean finance subsidiaries were entitled to
the benefits they were deriving under the treaty;
(2) That U.S. taxpayers were paying creditable income taxes to the Netherlands Antilles;
(3) That U.S. parents of Antillean finance subsidiaries would dissolve the subsidiaries on
enactment of the bill.
However, as the Treasury noted, it was not clear that the bill would cause taxpayers to claim less
foreign tax credits and thus, perhaps no indirect revenue increase would result. JoINT COMMrrrEE
PRINT op 1984, supra note 20, at 30-31.
Members of the securities industry predicted even higher gains from passage of H.R. 3025 and
H.R. 4029. During the earlier hearings on H.R. 3025 (when the industry painted a united front),
members of the industry called the Treasury's estimate of $35 to 50 million annual revenue gain
"conservative," and stated that they believed that the actual net revenue gain would more likely be
twice that amount. Revenue Increase Proposals, supra, note 41, at 319.
During the 1984 hearings on H.R. 3025 and H.R. 4029, however, the Treasury (which favored
H.R. 3025) and the faction of the securities industry which favored the narrow repeal of H.R. 4029
put forth disparate revenue figures. The Treasury, assuming that the passage of the foreign tax




Gibbons-Conable (H.R. 3025) +23
Barnard (H.R. 4029) +166
Senate Bill (see. 142-phase-in) +211
May 1, 1984 hearings, supra note 3, at 35.
Proponents of the narrow version of repeal, H.R. 4029 (which would have excluded the issues
of the federal government from the favorable interest exemption), contended that H.R. 4029 would
increase tax revenues by "at least $875 million over the next 6 years compared to the broad form of
repeal." This estimate assumed that the broad version of repeal would eliminate withholding on
assumed issues (le. those-currently outstanding). May 1, 1984 hearings, stipra, note 3, at 244. The
repeal legislation does not, however, extend to obligations in existence prior to the Act's effective
date. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, sec. 127(g)(1). Moreover, the estimate made by the proponents
of H.R. 4029 did not take into account the savings that would accrue to the federal government
under H.R. 3025 from the government's ability to finance the $1.5 trillion dollar public debt at lower
interest rates. This factor could add almost $1 billion to the revenues produced by H.R. 3025 (using
1/18 of 1% as the savings in interest). May 1, 1984 Hearings, supra note 3, at 103.
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currently withheld. For 1982, this amount was $152 million.2z04
(2) Indirectly, revenues would be generated by eliminating the foreign tax
credits which United States companies claimed for taxes paid to the
Netherlands Antilles.
20 5
(3) While there would be additional revenue gains from increased United
States employment and investment, 20 6 there would also be offsetting
losses from declines in exports and increases in interest expense, Ac-
celerated Cost Recovery deductions and investment tax credits.
2 °7
The Joint Committee on Taxation recently estimated that the repeal
legislation, as enacted, will lose $162 million in fiscal years 1984-1987,
although the committee has not disclosed its assumptions or methods of
computation.20 8 It appears, however, that this estimate does not take
into account the revenues to be generated by the changes in the foreign
tax credit, as these changes are accounted for under a separate section of
the 1984 Act.20 9
V. CONCLUSION: EFFECTS OF THE REPEAL LEGISLATION TO DATE
AND OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
Although a study done for Congress on the repeal legislation pre-
dicted a small impact on the strength of the dollar and the government's
revenues, 210 evidence to date suggests that the repeal in fact, contributed
to an all-time high valuation of the dollar during 1984.211 In some cir-
cles, this result has been criticized because of its adverse effects on the
balance of trade and the cost of exports.212 In addition, reactions of for-
eign governments suggest that the legislation was not a boon to foreign
relations. Both France and West Germany recently repealed their with-
holding rates on interest paid to foreigners in order to compete success-
204 JoiNT COMMrrrEE PRiNT OF 1984, supra note 20, at 30.
205 Id.
206 Hearings on S. 1557, supra note 30, at 245 (statement of Michael H. Coles of Goldman, Sachs
& Co.).
207 Joint Committee Print of 1984, supra note 20, at 31.
208 EXPLANATION OF THE 1984 Acr, supra note 6, at 1242.
209 The foreign tax credit provisions and their revenue effects are dealt with under § 121 of the
1984 Act. 1d at 1241.
210 CRS STUDY, supra note 16, at 35-37.
211 24 TAX NOTES 326 (Jul. 23, 1984). On December 31, 1984, the dollar set an 111/2 year high of
3.1550 marks, a 2-year high of 251.85 yen and matched a previous high of 9.6450 French francs.
For the first time, the British pound fell below $1.16, to $1.1583. Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1985, at 8, col.
3. During 1985, however, the dollar returned to lower levels. As of November 15, 1985, for exam-
ple, the dollar was valued at 2.6225 marks, 204.20 yen and 7.9950 French francs, while the pound
was valued at $1.4225. Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1985, at 53, col. 3.
212 See Testimony of Robert S. McIntyre before the Committee on Ways & Means, May 1, 1984
Hearings, supra note 3, at 237.
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fully for the pool of available foreign capital,213 and Japan recently
indicated its intent to do the same on Euroyen bonds.2 14 In light of these
developments, some members of Congress are seeking to reevaluate the
withholding legislation as a tool for regulating the value of the dollar. In
addition, the monitoring of potential tax evasion on Eurobond issues
continues in at least one House subcommittee.215
Despite these setbacks, it is clear that the repeal legislation has been
successful in accomplishing the purpose for which it was enacted-rais-
ing capital. In the first quarter of 1985 alone, United States companies
raised a record $9.4 billion in the foreign bond market.216 This figure
compares favorably with a monthly rate of $1.5 billion in 1984, a record
at that time. These capital flows should result in lower domestic interest
rates and, thus, should spur additional corporate investment in produc-
tive activities.
The results of a recent study on the effects of the 1975 removal of
the Canadian withholding tax217 reinforce this view. That study con-
cluded that removal of the withholding tax resulted in statistically signifi-
cant higher capital flows to the country and lower interest rates. The
lower interest rates also strengthened the corporate tax base, resulting in
higher revenues for the Canadian Treasury. While differences between
the United States and the Canadian economy may prevent a direct com-
parison in results, the thrust of the study seems applicable in light of the
United States experience. With the ability to attract such impressive
amounts of capital, corporations will be able to increase production and
213 The battle for the world savings has resulted from a shift in financial flows. Although from
1970-1978, the United States exported a net $76 billion in capital, the trend has reversed since 1978.
From 1979-1983, the Unites States borrowed a net $150 billion.
In order to compete for its share of world savings, France, on October 3, 1984, agreed to elimi-
nate the 26% withholding tax on interest paid to foreign investors. On the same day, West Germany
agreed to enact legislation to abolish its 25% withholding tax retroactive to August 1, 1984. Great
Britain has also begin to use a mechanism whereby certain bond issuances will be deemed tax-free on
an issue-by-issue basis. On August 16, 1984, the British government issued a $1.2 billion tax-free
bond. Observers contend, however, that these measures will not counteract the effect of the U.S.
repeal legislation. This is probably because U.S. issues are considered much more stable than those
of most other countries. 25 TAx NoTEs 275-76 (Oct. 15, 1984).
214 On January 7, 1985, Japanese and U.S. officials concluded talks in which the Japanese agreed
to submit to their Diet a proposal to repeal the 20% withholding tax on interest paid to nonresidents
on Euroyen bonds issued by Japanese residents. Report of the MOF/Treasury Working Group on
Withholding Taxes, Jan. 7, 1985, reprinted in 26 TAX NoTEs 232 (Jan. 21, 1985).
215 Rep. Doug Barnard, Chairman of the Consumer, Commerce & Monetary Affairs Subcommit-
tee of the House Government Operations Committee, plans to monitor compliance with the provi-
sions of the Act and the regulations through his committee. 24 TAX NOTES 325 (Jul. 23, 1984).
216 65 DEP'T OF COMM, SuRv. CuRRENT Bus. 38 (1985)
217 Brean, International Portfolio Capitak The Wedge of the Withholding Tax, 37 NAT'L TAX J.
239 (1984).
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employment. The federal government will lower its borrowing costs by
millions. The repeal of the withholding tax will indeed prove itself to
have been "a capital idea."
Marilyn Doskey Franson
